The Legal Protection of Animals in Sporting Events and the Case of the ‘Horse Athlete’ in Italian Law

Roberto Garetto *

Abstract

The participation of animals in sporting activities varies across legal systems: while some jurisdictions permit competitions between animals, others impose significant restrictions. Yet even where limitations exist, a form of cooperative sport involving both humans and animals persists. In such contexts, the animal cannot be regarded as a mere tool or instrument, comparable to sporting equipment, but must be recognised as a living being capable of experiencing pain, fatigue, and risk. As early as 1965, the Brambell Report in the United Kingdom articulated the principle of the five freedoms as a foundation for animal welfare. Today, Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union acknowledges animals as sentient beings, providing a normative basis for their legal protection in sport. Over the past decades, several EU Member States have constitutionalised animal protection – sometimes expressly grounded in the recognition of sentience. In Italy, the notion of the “animal athlete” has recently entered the legislative domain, offering a new framework for the legal safeguarding of animals involved in sport. While such recognition is consistent with that State’s constitutional principles, it also prompts reflection on the enduring categorisation of the sporting animal as a res, and the potential reconfiguration of this traditional legal status.

Keywords

Sporting animals, constitutionalisation of animal protection, animal sentience, horse-athlete, legal status of animals

Suggested Citation Style:

Garetto, Roberto (2026). The Legal Protection of Animals in Sporting Events and the Case of the ‘Horse Athlete’ in Italian Law. Journal of Animal Law, Ethics and One Health (LEOH), Special Issue on Rethinking Ecosphere and Biojustice: Legal Personality and Legal Rights Beyond the Human, 34–44. DOI: 10.58590/leoh.2026.007

 

* Director of the International Legal Institute of Turin, Honorary Professor of Civil Law at the Instituto de Ciencias e Investigación en Legislación y Jurisprudencia (INCILIJ), Tlaxcala (Mexico).

 

Content

 

I. Animal Participation in Sport: Legal Considerations and Historical Context

The involvement of animals in sporting activities manifests in diverse forms. Although historically some legal systems permitted inter-animal competitions as a form of spectacle, the majority of contemporary legal frameworks now prohibit or strictly limit such practices due to ethical and animal welfare considerations. Nonetheless, the prospect of a synergistic sporting performance involving both humans and animals continues to be contemplated and, in certain contexts, legally recognised.

Both competitions involving only animals and those featuring human-animal cooperation have been practiced since antiquity. In ancient Rome, wild animals were made to fight in the arena during venationes, while horses – already used by the Greeks – were employed in chariot races.[1] In subsequent historical periods, spectacles involving only animals, such as dog fights, cockfights, and bullfights, persisted mainly among the popular classes. Conversely, among the aristocracy, the use of animals – primarily horses – was closely associated with tournaments, hunting, and falconry.[2]

In more recent times, the horse has retained a central role within various equestrian disciplines, including polo,[3] where the practice of horsemanship remains both a technical and cultural cornerstone.[4] However, the involvement of animals in sporting events[5] is not limited to equines. Other species have historically been – and in certain contexts continue to be – employed for competitive purposes: camels are raced in desert regions; reindeer and dogs are harnessed for sled-pulling competitions in snowbound territories. In some jurisdictions, a variant of polo played with elephants persists, reflecting colonial-era adaptations of traditional equestrian sports.

In certain cases, animals still compete independently of direct human participation. Greyhound racing, for instance, has been practiced in the United States since as early as the 1920s.[6] Following the Second World War, the activity was legalised in the majority of US states.[7] Pigeon racing likewise constitutes a form of individual animal competition and remains recognised as a distinct sporting activity in various legal systems.[8]

Both categories of animal-involved sporting activities give rise to significant legal considerations regarding the extent of protection owed to the animals involved. In cases where animals compete independently, without direct human intervention during the event – such as in greyhound racing – legal oversight must ensure that preparatory practices, including breeding and training, do not amount to cruelty or mistreatment.

In sports involving human-animal cooperation, legal scrutiny must extend beyond the preparatory phase to encompass the nature of the interaction during the performance itself. Particular attention must be paid to the level of physical and psychological stress imposed on the animal, which must remain within thresholds compatible with the animal’s welfare and biological limitations. This is especially relevant in disciplines such as the modern pentathlon.

In this context, it becomes legally and ethically untenable to regard the animal as a mere tool or extension of the athlete, as may be the case in sports involving mechanical equipment such as bicycles, motorcycles, or automobiles – where regulatory oversight is limited to technical compliance. By contrast, in disciplines requiring a synergistic relationship between human and animal, the latter must be recognised as a sentient participant. Accordingly, legal standards must take into account the animal’s capacity to experience pain, fatigue, and risk, ensuring its protection as a subject of interest rather than as a passive instrument of performance.

Notably, the Olympic Charter[9] – which sets out the fundamental principles of Olympism and emphasises the social, cultural, and educational dimensions of sport[10] – makes no explicit reference to the involvement or protection of animals in sporting activities. As a result, the regulation of animal welfare in disciplines involving animals is left to the discretion of the respective International Federations. This normative silence reflects the anthropocentric cultural framework within which the ideology of modern Olympism emerged in the late nineteenth century.[11]

A striking illustration of this historical disregard for animal welfare can be found in the inclusion of a live pigeon shooting event at the 1900 Olympic Games in Paris. In that competition, live birds were released in front of the participants, and the winner was determined by the number of pigeons killed. The event, marked by public criticism and logistical difficulties, was ultimately deemed a failure and was excluded from all subsequent editions of the Games.[12]

II. The Relevance of the EU in the Protection of Animals

Although philosophers and jurists such as Jeremy Bentham had already, towards the end of the eighteenth century, recognised the moral relevance of animal sentience – famously stating that “The question is not Can they reason? or Can they talk? but Can they suffer?”[13] – the legal recognition of animals as sentient beings has been a more recent development. It is only in the past few decades that legal systems, including that of the European Union, have progressively internalised this ethical awareness. Nonetheless, such sensitivity remained largely absent from legal instruments until more recent times.

A pivotal expression of this shift is found in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which formally acknowledges animals as sentient beings and imposes a duty on Member States to pay full regard to animal welfare in the formulation and implementation of certain policies.[14]

This provision is of particular legal significance insofar as, by recognising animal sentience, it implicitly affirms animals’ capacity to experience sensations and to be aware of their environment. In light of the normative weight accorded to this recognition within the framework of the TFEU, the subsequent analysis focuses on the legal contours and implications of the concept of animal welfare.[15]

These implications are manifold, many of which are particularly relevant in the context of sporting activities involving animals. While the broader framework includes ethical, religious, cultural, and scientific considerations,[16] it is within the realm of sport that specific tensions emerge between performance demands and the protection of the animal’s well-being. From a legal perspective, animal welfare in sport must be evaluated not only in terms of the animal’s capacity to adapt to its environment, but also with reference to the compatibility of training methods, competitive conditions, and overall treatment with the animal’s ethological characteristics and behavioural needs.

In the 1960s, the British government commissioned an expert committee to investigate the conditions of animals kept for agricultural purposes, resulting in the publication of the Brambell Report.[17] This document proved to be a foundational milestone in the evolution of animal welfare regulation, exerting considerable influence not only on legislative developments within the United Kingdom but also across continental Europe.[18] The report contributed to the emergence of a shared regulatory approach within the European Economic Community, supporting the formulation of early legislative instruments on animal protection and shaping the evolving legal framework of animal welfare within the EU.[19] It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom acceded to the European Economic Community in 1973, shortly after the report’s release, and remained a member until its withdrawal in 2020 following the Brexit process.

The Brambell Report articulated what would later become known as the five “freedoms” fundamental to the legal and ethical protection of animal welfare.[20] These include the freedom from hunger, thirst, and malnutrition, which requires that animals have continuous access to fresh water and a diet adequate to maintain health and vigour; the freedom from environmental discomfort, which entails the obligation to provide animals with appropriate shelter and a comfortable resting area, adapted not only to climatic conditions but also to the specific physical and behavioural needs of the species; the freedom from injury and disease, which imposes a duty to prevent physical suffering through regular health monitoring, access to veterinary care, and the implementation of preventive measures designed to avoid pain, illness, and functional impairments; the freedom to express normal, species-specific behaviours, which recognises the need to accommodate behavioural instincts by ensuring that animals are granted sufficient space, environmental enrichment, and opportunities for social interaction, thereby enabling them to engage in natural patterns of activity; and finally, the freedom from fear and distress, which addresses the psychological dimension of animal welfare by requiring that animals be kept in conditions that minimise stress and anxiety, and that handling practices avoid the infliction of mental suffering.

While the first three freedoms are relatively straightforward and commonly acknowledged as essential components of welfare protections, the latter two demand a more refined analysis. Their assessment is inherently complex, as it involves subjective criteria and is highly susceptible to the quality of human-animal interaction. This challenge is particularly acute in the context of sport, where the animal is subject to physical and psychological pressures related to performance. In such settings, a structural tension arises between competitive objectives and the imperative to safeguard animal welfare[21] – one that calls for the establishment of robust legal safeguards and regulatory oversight.

III. The Constitutionalisation of Animal Protection in the EU’s Integrated Legal Framework

Within the European Union, certain Member States have elevated animal welfare to the status of a constitutional principle, enshrining it in their respective fundamental charters. Germany was one of the first Member States to incorporate a constitutional provision specifically addressing animal welfare. Article 20a of the Grundgesetz (GG), the German Basic Law, was initially introduced by the Federal Act of 27 October 1994, as part of a broader constitutional reform aimed at strengthening environmental protection. A subsequent amendment in 2002 expanded the scope of the article through the explicit inclusion of a reference to animals (“und die Tiere”), reflecting a broader cultural debate and a high level of public concern.[22] The current wording of the provision affirms that the State shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals, in accordance with its responsibility toward future generations, through the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.

Legal scholarship has underscored that Article 20a GG functions as a constitutional state objective,[23] which imposes a positive obligation on both the legislature and the public administration. While it does not confer subjective rights upon animals – nor, by extension, upon individuals or legal entities such as animal welfare organisations[24] – it nonetheless carries constitutional weight. The provision operates as a transversal constitutional principle, capable of guiding the interpretation of other constitutional norms, particularly in contexts requiring the balancing of conflicting constitutional interests.[25] Importantly, however, this does not entail a preferential or absolute prioritisation of animal protection over other constitutionally safeguarded interests.[26]

Although Article 20a GG marks a significant constitutional development, it remains essential to clarify that animals are not recognised as holders of fundamental rights. Nonetheless, Section 90a of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) expressly affirms that animals are not to be regarded as objects (“Sachen”). The provisions applicable to objects are to be applied to animals only insofar as no alternative legal regulation exists.

Within this framework, German law adopts a negative qualification of the legal status of animals: they are defined as “non-objects”. Yet paradoxically, they remain, in part, subject to the same legal regime as objects, unless otherwise provided by specific legislation.[27]

Shortly after the German constitutional reform, Austria witnessed a vibrant animal advocacy campaign,[28] which culminated in the enactment of the Animal Welfare Act in 2004.[29]

However, it took several more years before the Austrian Constitution, following the German model,[30] would explicitly establish a state duty to ensure the protection of animals.

This recognition was eventually provided by the Federal Constitutional Act of 23 May 2013 on Sustainability and Animal Welfare, specifically in § 2.[31] The constitutional provision adopted in Austria, much like its German counterpart, draws a clear distinction between the State as the guarantor of animal welfare, citizens, and the animals themselves, for whose benefit the rule is enacted.[32] Animals are not recognised as holders of rights; rather, the norm is designed to guide legislative and administrative action in favour of their protection.

In recent years, Italy has undertaken a process of constitutionalising animal protection, culminating in the adoption of Constitutional Law no 1 of 11 February 2022. This constitutional amendment revised Article 9 of the Italian Constitution, introducing an express reference to the protection of animals and assigning to the State the responsibility to define the modalities and instruments through which such protection is to be ensured.

It is particularly noteworthy that the Italian constitutional reform does not predicate the protection of animals on the notion of sentience, notwithstanding the fact that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which explicitly recognises animals as sentient beings, had long been in force at the time of the reform. This omission is not without legal significance. Article 9 of the Italian Constitution also enshrines the protection of the landscape and the nation’s historical and artistic heritage – interests that are, by their very nature, non-sentient. From this, one may infer that, under Italian constitutional law, the attribution of constitutional protection does not necessarily require the recognition of sentience as a prerequisite.

Nonetheless, it can be reasonably inferred that the explicit reference to animal protection in the Italian Constitution entails an implicit acknowledgment of animals’ sentient nature and the corresponding obligation to ensure their welfare. This interpretation is reinforced by Article 13 TFEU, which formally recognises animals as sentient beings and requires that full regard be given to their welfare in the formulation and implementation of certain Union policies.

As a provision of EU primary law, Article 13 TFEU constitutes a source of what has been defined in legal scholarship as “European constitutional law”,[33] and has direct effect within Member States, without the need for national constitutional transposition. Within the Italian legal system, therefore, this norm operates in complementarity with Article 9 of the Constitution, enriching its normative scope in relation to animal protection. Moreover, irrespective of the formal reception of European constitutional principles, the very act of recognising animals as deserving of specific legal safeguards necessarily presupposes an ethical and legal concern for their welfare.

Recent constitutional developments in several EU Member States are of particular legal significance, as they include explicit references to animal sentience – thereby reflecting, at least implicitly, the influence of Article 13 TFEU. In Luxembourg, animal protection had already been afforded constitutional recognition as early as 1999, with the introduction of former Article 11bis, which imposed on the State the obligation to promote the protection and welfare of animals.[34] However, a major constitutional reform was enacted in 2023, resulting in the promulgation of a new Constitution. Under this revised framework, the previous Article 11bis has been replaced by Article 41(3), which now formally recognises animals as non-human living beings endowed with sentience, and obliges the State to ensure their welfare. Likewise, in 2024, Belgium amended its Constitution to introduce Article 7bis, which explicitly guarantees the protection and welfare of animals as sentient beings. This provision marks a significant constitutional advancement by affirming the moral and legal relevance of animal sentience and aligning national constitutional law more closely with the normative content of Article 13 TFEU.[35]

IV. The Implementation of the Constitutional Principle of Animal Protection in Domestic Legislation: The Case of the “Horse-Athlete” in Italian Law

Although formally limited in scope, the Italian constitutional reform – inasmuch as the final text does not make express reference to animal sentience (as discussed in the preceding paragraph) – nonetheless operates within a legal framework of particular relevance to the protection of animals in sporting contexts. Indeed, at the substantive level, the Italian legal system explicitly recognises and comprehensively regulates the legal status of the so-called “horse-athlete”.[36]

Even prior to the constitutional reform enacted through Constitutional Law no 1 of 11 February 2022 – which formally incorporated the protection of animals into Article 9 of the Italian Constitution – the Italian legislature had already initiated a series of normative interventions in the domains of sport and animal welfare. These included the reorganisation of the institutional framework governing both professional and amateur sporting activities, as set forth in Law no 86 of 8 August 2019, and the subsequent adoption of Legislative Decree no 36 of 28 February 2021, which provided for the implementation of delegated provisions on sport. Following the constitutional amendment, Legislative Decree no 163 of 5 October 2022 was enacted with the express objective of ensuring consistency between the legislative framework and the newly introduced constitutional principles. Collectively, these measures reflect a dual legislative intent: to promote the cultural, educational, and social value of sport, and to strengthen the legal safeguards for the protection of animals.

The legislative provisions enacted shortly prior to the constitutional reform – and which remain in force within the Italian legal system – already evidenced a discernible alignment with the principles subsequently enshrined in the amended constitutional text. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is Title IV of Legislative Decree no 36 of 28 February 2021, which comprises Articles 19 to 24 and establishes a general regulatory framework for the protection of animals used in sporting activities, alongside specific rules applicable to equestrian disciplines. These provisions aim to harmonise the competencies of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies, thereby instituting a coherent and integrated regime governing the use of animals in sport in Italy.

Article 19(1) is of particular relevance, as it draws inspiration from the foundational principles of the Brambell Report, establishing a link between the welfare of sport animals and the provision of appropriate nutrition, healthcare, and attention to their ethological characteristics. The latter notion is to be understood as an obligation to ensure conditions of care and treatment that are consistent with the species-specific behavioural traits of the animal. Article 19(2) further reinforces this framework by expressly referring to the animal’s “psychophysical well-being,” thereby implicitly invoking the freedom from fear and distress, as articulated in the Brambell model.[37]

Article 19 is of particular legal significance in that it explicitly refers, in the context of training, to the cognitive faculties and learning modalities of the animal. In relation to sporting competitions, it establishes a clear prohibition whereby any individual or legal entity responsible for an animal used in sport is forbidden from subjecting such animal – during its cooperative activity with a human participant – to levels of exertion that are incompatible with its physiological condition.

The expression “horse-athlete” is also employed in Title IV of the Legislative Decree, specifically within the section devoted to equestrian sports. Article 22 delineates the formal requirements for classification as a “horse-athlete”. To that end, the equid must be duly registered with the Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (Italian Equestrian Sports Federation) or with other competent national or international federations or entities operating in the equestrian sector and must be officially declared as not intended for food production.

The regulatory framework concerning the “horse-athlete” has been further refined by Articles 10 et seq of Legislative Decree no 163 of 5 October 2022, which introduced targeted amendments to Title IV of Legislative Decree no 36 of 28 February 2021. These amendments were adopted with the express aim of aligning national provisions on the “registered horse” with the relevant standards set forth in European Union law.

Specifically, Legislative Decree no 163/2022 reinforces national rules on the identification, traceability, and registration of horses involved in competitive sport, thereby implementing the provisions of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/963 of 10 June 2021.[38]

This Regulation, which forms part of the broader EU Animal Health Law framework established under Regulation (EU) 2016/429,[39] lays down uniform rules governing the identification of horses and the documentation of their movements within the Union. Its primary objectives are to enhance traceability, facilitate disease prevention and control, and ensure harmonisation of identification systems across all Member States.

V. Conclusion and Outlook

The expression “animal-athlete” is now gaining increasing currency[40] and has been formally incorporated into the Italian legislative lexicon through the designation “horse-athlete”. This terminology appears to transcend the conventional semantic scope of the term “athlete”, which, prior to this legislative development, had been exclusively reserved for human beings.[41] Such a semantic extension – analogous to the evolving use of the expression “non-human animal” in legal scholarship[42] – may elicit criticism or hesitation in certain doctrinal or institutional contexts. Nonetheless, it reflects a broader and deepening societal awareness regarding the condition of animals, particularly those in close domesticated relationships with humans, which are progressively perceived as possessing qualities and capacities traditionally attributed to persons.

Notwithstanding this evolving sensibility, it must be acknowledged that, pursuant to the Italian Civil Code of 1942, animals continue to be classified as mere objects of property rights.[43] Accordingly, despite their sentient nature, animals remain legally designated as res, devoid of legal subjectivity. The condition of sentience – lacking precise qualitative or quantitative parameters – could, in principle, be ascribed to all animal species, including invertebrates and insects. Even if the concept were confined to animals exhibiting “higher” cognitive capacities,[44] further conceptual and normative challenges would arise: which categories of animals, by virtue of their sentience, would warrant differentiated legal treatment? And would such differentiation entail the recognition of a legal status approaching subjecthood – potentially implying the attribution of certain rights, if not correlative duties? It remains a matter of fact that certain animals, such as pigs, for example, which are widely acknowledged to possess advanced levels of cognitive capacity and self-awareness, continue to be systematically bred for food production. Conversely, other species, including rats, are routinely exterminated on the basis of their presumed harmfulness or classification as pests.[45]

Against this backdrop, Legislative Decrees no 36 of 28 February 2021 and no 163 of 5 October 2022 offer a significant foundation for legal reflection and analysis with respect to the normative treatment of animals within the Italian legal order.

The exclusion of so-called “horse-athletes” from the food production chain under current Italian legislation does not, in itself, amount to the conferral of a “right” upon animals engaged in competitive sport. Rather, it reflects a discretionary faculty vested in the owner, who may, at a time of their choosing, elect to retain the horse for sporting purposes rather than consigning it to slaughter. Although this decision is irrevocable once made, it remains an exclusive prerogative of the owner.[46] The rationale underpinning the prohibition on food use is not rooted in any intention to “reward” the animal for its athletic performance. Instead, it is primarily dictated by public health considerations – specifically, the imperative to safeguard food safety by excluding from the human food chain animals that, owing to their exposure to intensive training regimens and veterinary treatments associated with competitive sport, may have received substances incompatible with food safety regulations.[47]

Accordingly, the designation of the horse as an “athlete” does not, in and of itself, confer a shift in the animal’s legal status from object to subject. It does, however, signal an attempt by the legal order to respond to evolving societal sensibilities surrounding animal welfare. The increasing scholarly focus on animals involved in sport may contribute to the emergence – within both legal doctrine and case law – of new interpretative paradigms that challenge the traditional dichotomy between res and legal personhood. A reassessment of this dichotomy in light of ancient Roman law – particularly in view of the flexibility of the res/persona classification as posited by Gaius[48] – may provide a meaningful contribution. In the coming decades, it will be incumbent upon the legislature to engage with these evolving legal and ethical perspectives by developing a regulatory framework that, while remaining rooted in established legal principles, responds to the normative expectations of a society increasingly attentive to the welfare and moral status of animals.

[1] Wray Vamplew, ‘Bread and Circuses, Olive Oil and Money: Commercialised Sport in Ancient Greece and Rome’ (2022) 39(6) The International Journal of the History of Sport 594–95.

[2] Philip Howell, ‘Hunting and Animal-Human History’ in Hilda Kean and Philip Howell (eds), The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History (Routledge 2018) 766.

[3] Jane Badger and Timothy G Dawson, ‘Playing Chicken: The Early History and Modern Revival of an Ancient Game’ in Anastasija Ropa (ed), Historical Practices in Horsemanship and Equestrian Sports (Trivent Publishing 2022) 263.

[4] Sarah Sargent, ‘Foxhunting and Classical Horsemanship as Social Performance of Elitism and Power: A Journey Across Time’ in Anastasija Ropa (ed), Historical Practices in Horsemanship and Equestrian Sports (Trivent Publishing 2022) 269.

[5] The term “sport” emerged in the English language during the Industrial Revolution and, in the early 19th century, still lacked direct equivalents in other languages. See Nigel B Crowther, Sport in Ancient Times (Praeger 2007) xxi.

[6] Gwyneth Anne Thayer, Going to the Dogs: Greyhound Racing, Animal Activism, and American Popular Culture (University Press of Kansas 2013) 7.

[7] Thayer (n 6) 10.

[8] Jan Deckers and Silvina Pezzetta, ‘The ethics of pigeon racing’ (2023) 17(4) Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 465.

[9] The Olympic Charter is the official document in which the rules and guidelines governing the organisation of the Olympic Games are codified. It regulates the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Sports Federations operating under its authority, and the National Olympic Committees. First published in 1908 under the title Annuaire du Comité International Olympique, it adopted its current designation in 1978. See Guido Valori, Il diritto nello Sport (Giappichelli 2016) 85–6.

[10] Some commentators, drawing on models of self-regulation typical of soft law, have described the Olympic Charter as a form of “soft Constitution”. See Julio César Muñiz Pérez, ‘Coubertin y la Carta Olímpica: un ejemplo de Constitución transnacional o soft-Constitución’ (2022) 23 Materiales para la Historia del Deporte 21.

[11] Nikolaos Patsantaras, ‘Olympic Messages: Olympic Ideology and Olympic Social Reality’ (2008) 4(1) Sport Management International Journal 46.

[12] Benjamin Dettmar, ‘Reintroducing the Olympics: Making Track and Field Relevant’ in Danielle Sarver Coombs and Bob Batchelor (eds), American History through American Sports: From Colonial Lacrosse to Extreme Sports, vol I (Praeger 2013) 246.

[13] Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Hafner Publishing Co 1948) 311. The famous phrase, however, does not appear in the main body of the text but is instead contained in a footnote written by the author. See Randolph Otto, ‘Bentham and the “Famous Footnote”’ (2020) 23(1) Between the Species 155.

[14] José Martinez and Cara von Nolting, ‘Review: “Animal welfare” – A European concept’ (2023) 17(100839) Animals 3.

[15] On the relationship between sentience and animal welfare, see Agata C Amato Mangiameli, Natur@. Dimensioni della Biogiuridica (Giappichelli 2021) 106ff.

[16] Martinez and von Nolting (n 14) 5.

[17] Francis WR Brambell and Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of Animals kept under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems, Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of Animals kept under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems (Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1965).

[18] Isabelle Veissier, Andrew Butterworth, Bettina Bock and Emma Roe, ‘European approaches to ensure good animal welfare’ (2008) 113(4) Applied Animal Behaviour Science 280.

[19] Carla Zarbà, Biagio Pecorino and Gioacchino Pappalardo, ‘Animal welfare in the Common Agricultural Policy evolution’ (2023) 78(2) Italian Review of Agricultural Economics 99–100.

[20] David J Mellor, ‘Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living”’ (2016) 6(3) Animals 2.

[21] José Manuel Ríos Corbacho, ‘Animales en el deporte: una aproximación desde la óptica del derecho penal’ (2020) 22 Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología 3.

[22] Kate M Nattrass, ‘“Und Die Tiere”: Constitutional Protection for Germany’s Animals’ (2004) 10(1) Animal Law Review 285–88.

[23] See Johannes Caspar and Martin Geissen, ‘Das neue Staatsziel Tierschutz in Art. 20a GG’ (2002) 21 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 914–17; Clemens Christoph Hillmer, Auswirkungen einer Staatszielbestimmung “Tierschutz” im Grundgesetz, insbesondere auf die Forschungsfreiheit (Peter Lang 2000) 141.

[24] Elien Verniers, ‘The impact of including animals in the constitution – Lessons learned from the German animal welfare state objective’ (2005) 1 Global Journal of Animal Law 5.

[25] Nattrass (n 22) 303.

[26] Nattrass (n 22) 294.

[27] Eva Bernet Kempers, ‘Neither persons nor things: the changing status of animals in private law’ (2021) 29(1) Revue européenne de droit privé 46.

[28] Martin Balluchpp, ‘How Austria Achieved a Historic Breakthrough for Animals’ in Peter Singer (ed), In Defense of Animals. The Second Wave (Blackwell 2006) 159–62.

[29] Debbie Legge, ‘Key Animal Law Across Europe’ in Andrew Knight, Clive Phillips and Paula Sparks (eds), Routledge Handbook of Animal Welfare (Routledge 2022) 402.

[30] A similar constitutional obligation, outside the context of the European Union, can be found in Switzerland. See Vanessa Gerritsen, ‘Animal Welfare in Switzerland – constitutional aim, social commitment, and a major challenge’ (2013) 1 Global Journal of Animal Law 2.

[31] Konrad Lachmayer, ‘The Constitutional Context of Climate Change Litigation. A comparative analysis of Germany and Austria’ in Ivano Alogna, Carole Billiet, Matteo Fermeglia and Alina Holzhausen (eds), Climate Change Litigation in Europe. Regional, Comparative and Sectoral Perspectives (Intersentia 2023) 63.

[32] Jessica Eisen, ‘Animals in the constitutional state’ (2017) 15(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 929.

[33] On the notion of “European constitutional law,” see Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 3ff.; Antonio Ruggeri, ‘Una Costituzione ed un diritto costituzionale per l’Europa unita’ in Pasquale Costanzo, Luca Mezzetti and Antonio Ruggeri (eds), Lineamenti di Diritto costituzionale dell'Unione Europea (Giappichelli 2014) 19.

[34] Giovanni Botto, ‘Gli animali “in quanto esseri senzienti”: riflessioni intorno alla riforma costituzionale belga del 2024’ (2024) 3 DPCE online 1622.

[35] Botto (n 34) 1624.

[36] See Roberto Garetto, ‘La tutela degli animali negli eventi sportivi’, in Maurizio Di Masi (ed), Istituzioni di diritto sportivo per Scienze motorie e sportive (Giappichelli 2023) 237–38.

[37] See above, para 2.

[38] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/963 of 10 June 2021 laying down rules for the application of Regulations (EU) 2016/429, (EU) 2016/1012 and (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the identification and registration of equine animals and establishing model identification documents for those animals, OJ L 213, 16 June 2021.

[39] Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’), OJ L 84, 31 March 2016.

[40] See Marine Lercier, ‘Welfare protection of the animal-athlete in the sports company in light of the evolution of the legal regime for animals’ (2019) 10(1) Derecho Animal Forum of Animal Law Studies 61ff. For a comparison between the (human) athlete and the “animal-athlete”, see Duncan J Irschick and Timothy E Higham, Animal Athletes: An Ecological and Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University Press) 220ff.

[41] Zoltán Kövecses, ‘Toward the Semantics of Sport’ (1976) 18(4) Semiotica 18, 313.

[42] See Julie Hilden, ‘A Contractarian View of Animal Rights: Insuring Against the Possibility of Being a Non-Human Animal’ (2007–2008) 14(5) Animal Law Review 8: “non-human animals are far closer to ‘persons’ than ‘property’”.

[43] See Diana Cerini, ‘Lo strano caso dei soggetti-oggetti: gli animali nel sistema italiano e l’esigenza di una riforma’ (2019) 10(2) Derecho Animal Forum of Animal Law Studies 2; Francesca Rescigno, I diritti degli animali: da res a soggetti (Giappichelli 2005) 89.

[44] See John Webster, ‘Animal Sentience and Animal Welfare: What is to Them and What is to Us?’ (2006) 100(1) Applied Animal Behaviour Science 1.

[45] See Roberto Garetto, ‘Consideraciones críticas sobre la subjetividad jurídica del animal, entre necesidad concreta de protección y “nuevas” perspectivas culturales’ (2016) 9(2) Revista de derecho, empresa y sociedad 127.

[46] Norma Borgese, ‘Il benessere animale nello sport’ (2020) 2 Rivista di Diritto Sportivo 250–51.

[47] Borgese (n 46) 251.

[48] See Roberto Garetto, ‘Animal and slave in Roman law. Taxonomic issues related to the notion of res’ (Paper presented at the 6th SWS International Scientific Conference on Arts and Humanities, Florence, 22–24 October 2019), in (2019) 6(2) Conference Proceedings 13.

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