Farm Animal Welfare in Breeding and Gene Editing: a Comparative Analysis of European Union and Swiss Law

Ilaria Cimadori *

Abstract

Whether through conventional breeding or new gene editing technologies such as CRISPR-Cas 9, farm animal breeding can impact animal welfare positively or negatively, depending on how breeders design the breeding program. An emphasis on productivity traits has often resulted in detrimental effects on the welfare of various farm animal species. This paper conducts a comparative legal analysis of European Union (EU) and Swiss legislation on biotechnology, animal welfare, and breeding. The paper shows the approaches these two jurisdictions take, highlighting differences and similarities, and offers an overall assessment of how effectively the relevant laws address the welfare concerns identified in the scientific literature. Ethical and philosophical literature also inform the analysis, considering the extent to which the laws align with an ethical animal welfare approach that recognizes animals as sentient beings with intrinsic value whose interests merit consideration and protection. The analysis reveals that both EU primary and secondary laws are weaker overall than Swiss legislation from either perspective. Specifically, EU laws either fail to adequately address the issues identified in the scientific literature, leaving animals vulnerable to potential suffering from breeding, or do not consider animals’ interests meaningfully. The paper concludes by proposing reforms, primarily by incorporating specific Swiss approaches into EU law.

Keywords

Animal welfare, selective breeding, gene editing, Swiss law, EU Law

Suggested Citation Style

Cimadori, Ilaria (2025). Farm Animal Welfare in Breeding and Gene Editing: A Comparative Analysis of European Union and Swiss Law. Journal of Animal Law, Ethics and One Health (LEOH), 185-215. DOI: 10.58590/leoh.2025.014

 

* Yale School of the Environment, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.

 

Content

 

I. Introduction

In both European Union (EU) countries and Switzerland, animal welfare is recognized as a shared social concern and a fundamental moral value, extending to the welfare of farm animals.[1] For instance, in the EU, the latest Eurobarometer survey reports that 84% of European citizens believe farm animals should be better protected in their country.[2] The “End the Cage Age” initiative, an EU-wide campaign that gathered over 1.4 million signatures to ban cages in farming, illustrates the depth of public concern.[3] In response, the European Commission pledged in 2021 to introduce legislation to phase out and eventually prohibit cages for certain species. In Switzerland, where constitutional amendments require a public vote, citizens have voted to enshrine animal welfare (Article 80) and, more recently, the dignity of the creature (Article 120) in the Swiss Constitution.

Despite these shared values and high levels of public concern, the EU and Switzerland differ significantly in how they protect farm animals through the law, particularly in breeding.

Farm animal breeding has historically relied on selective breeding, defined as “the process of modifying the characteristics of living things especially to enhance one or more desirable traits by selection in breeding controlled by humans.”[4] While humans have practiced breeding for millennia,[5] modern methods trace back to eighteenth-century Britain, where Robert Bakewell pioneered controlled breeding through record-keeping and inbreeding to produce consistent and improved traits.[6] Since then, breeding has evolved thanks to technologies such as artificial insemination, genomics, early genetic engineering, and cloning.[7] More recently, gene editing (GE) technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9 have introduced powerful tools for precise genome modification.[8] Unlike earlier techniques, CRISPR does not necessarily involve the insertion of foreign DNA; instead, it enables targeted DNA edits, thereby accelerating the development of desired traits.[9] Compared to selective breeding, CRISPR can also preserve traits that might otherwise be lost, and facilitate the development of characteristics (i.e., disease resistance) that are challenging or impossible to achieve through traditional methods.[10]

A global debate continues over how to regulate GE technologies, whether they pose distinct risks from those associated with selective breeding and other techniques with a longer history of use, and thus ultimately whether legislators should regulate GE differently. Potential risks discussed in the literature include unintended genetic changes from off- or on-target mutations, phenotypic effects that may harm animals, the integration of repair templates in unintended locations, and pleiotropic effects that alter multiple genes, potentially interfering with physiological or behavioral functioning, causing suffering, or increasing disease susceptibility.[11] Risks may also differ depending on the technique used (i.e., GE, other established genomic technologies (EGTs), or conventional selective breeding) and whether the resulting organism is transgenic (i.e., contains foreign DNA) or not. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) recently published a scientific opinion to assess the adequacy and sufficiency of current EFSA guidance for animal risk assessment.[12] The opinion states that some GE methods, particularly those that do not involve foreign DNA and produce changes similar to conventional breeding, do not pose novel hazards compared to EGTs or traditional breeding.[13] For techniques involving the insertion of larger DNA sequences, EFSA considers the associated risks lower than those posed by earlier techniques due to greater precision.[14] In terms of the traits introduced, transgenic edits carry the same risk type as those produced through EGTs, while cisgenic traits are comparable to those from conventional breeding.[15] Regarding off-target mutations, EFSA concludes that they are comparable in nature to those occurring in conventional breeding and therefore do not pose novel hazards.[16] However, a recent National Academy of Sciences report, focused on heritable genetic modification on food animals, has cautioned that unintended alterations, although less frequent in GE than in transgenesis, still require careful screening and characterization in animals intended for production.[17] It further emphasizes that these risks are not unique to GE, but apply to any mutation, natural or human-induced.[18]

While EFSA essentially finds that new genomic techniques (NGTs) present similar risks to traditional methods, a more pervasive concern in breeding programs, regardless of method, is the nature of the traits being selected. Prioritizing productivity traits has led to well-documented welfare harms across all major farm species.[19] Broiler chickens bred for rapid growth suffer from skeletal disorders, heart failure, footpad dermatitis, and sudden death syndrome. Dairy cows could experience higher rates of mastitis and lameness; beef cattle bred for hypermuscularity may face dystocia;[20] sows bred to produce bigger litters may be exposed to several welfare issues.[21] A related concern involves the potential use of animal disenhancement (i.e., strategies, through breeding or GE, aimed at reducing animals’ physical or sensory capacities such as feeling pain or potentially their own sentience[22]). One example is the breeding of blind chickens to reduce aggression in crowded conditions.[23]

Though sometimes proposed as welfare improvements, such strategies raise fundamental ethical questions and have prompted divergent ethical views. Some scholars defend disenhancement as a pragmatic solution if dismantling industrial systems is not feasible.[24] Others criticize such approaches as technological fixes that hide systemic problems, reinforce exploitative conditions, and delay more meaningful reform.[25]

Within these tensions, this paper adopts an ethical animal welfare framework that views animals as sentient beings with intrinsic value. This perspective calls for legal and regulatory systems to give greater weight to animals’ interests. Even where animals continue to be used in food production, their welfare must be taken seriously, and systems rather than animals should be adapted accordingly. As such, practices like removing pain perception, suppressing natural behaviors, or enhancing growth at the expense of welfare fall outside this approach. Such strategies risk entrenching the systems that compromise animal welfare under the guise of innovation or reform. Even welfare-oriented traits, such as disease resistance or hornlessness, should not justify lowering broader welfare standards or easing scrutiny of intensive systems. On the other hand, breeding and GE may align with this view when genuinely used to reduce suffering, for instance by addressing and correcting the welfare issues caused by pursuing productivity traits. 

This perspective informs the comparative analysis that follows. It also aligns with growing scientific recognition of animal sentience[26] and public attitudes in both the EU and Switzerland. Surveys show that support is stronger when GE is used to enhance welfare rather than productivity, underscoring the need to clearly distinguish between these goals in ethical and regulatory terms.[27]

This paper builds on a prior analysis of EU law on farm animal breeding[28] and extends that work through a comparative analysis with Swiss law. It examines how each jurisdiction regulates traditional selective breeding and newer gene editing techniques and assesses whether their respective frameworks adequately address the harms and ethical concerns identified in the scientific and ethical literature. Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it maintains strong political and commercial ties while independently setting its legal standards, making it a valuable comparator in evaluating regulatory approaches within the broader European context.

As this paper will demonstrate, Swiss law, although not without limitations, provides a stricter and more comprehensive regulatory framework for animal breeding than EU law. It better addresses concerns raised in the scientific and ethical literature, especially in relation to selective breeding, which remains largely unregulated in the EU. In the realm of GE, Swiss and EU law are more aligned, but Swiss law incorporates stricter safeguards, notably through its explicit protection of animal dignity, a concept absent from EU law. Crucially, the Swiss approach better reflects the ethical animal welfare framework adopted here as Swiss animal law is geared to prioritize animal interests, at least in theory, over productivity and sets clear standards for farm animal breeding.

II. Animal Breeding, Gene Editing and Animal Welfare: Regulations in the European Union and Switzerland

1. EU Primary Law and Swiss Constitutional Law

a) European Union Treaties

In the European Union (EU), animal welfare is neither a value nor an objective of the Union included in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) listed in Articles 2 and 3. However, in the EU, animals were recognized as sentient beings in Article 13 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), thus including animal welfare within the values protected by the Union in policy-making.[29]

The recognition of animals’ sentience in Article 13 was a gradual process. The first relevant legal instrument was the Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty[30] in 1992, where the EU institutions and the Member States were required “to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals” when drafting legislation on the common agricultural policy, transport, the internal market, and research.[31] However, the Declaration was not legally binding and did not provide remarkable improvements to animals’ welfare.[32] The Declaration was followed by the Protocol on Protection and Welfare of Animals[33] (Protocol no 33), which was annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam during a revision of the EU constitutional treaties in 1997.[34] Protocol no 33 recognizes animals as sentient beings for the first time, even though only in the preamble.[35] However, compared to the Declaration, the Protocol is binding and constitutes primary law.[36] During the latest revision of the EU treaties in 2007 with the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol no 33 was included in the TFEU through Article 13 with the exact wording. However, together with agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, and research, the legislator enlarged the scope of the Article to fisheries, technological development, and space policies.[37] The Article states the following:

  • In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.

Through this article, animal welfare appears to be worthy of protection due to the sentience of the animals in itself, thus technically, regardless of other interests.[38] The article is addressed to the EU institutions and Member States.[39] It appears within the provisions of general application under Title II of the TFEU, thus conferring animal welfare a widespread reach, as it must be considered in all EU policy-making.[40] Therefore, the requirement to “paying full regard” necessitates all secondary laws to be interpreted according to this provision.[41] However, according to Sowery, Article 13 provides only a guideline for the EU institutions and Member States without requiring them to achieve any specific outcome.[42] Therefore, decisions are needed to realize this obligation.[43] Additionally, the requirement to “pay full regard” to animal welfare is counterbalanced by broad exceptions for religious rites, cultural tradition, and regional heritage,[44] which may create variability within the Union regarding animal protection. At the same time, the article’s language fails to mention animals’ feelings and needs.[45]

Furthermore, the article ties animal welfare regulation to other specific policies. Animal welfare in the EU cannot be regulated by itself because it is not an independent policy area within the Union.[46] The EU may regulate animal welfare through its competence to regulate agriculture,[47] a competence shared with the Member States, the internal market,[48] also a shared competence, and through Article 352 TFEU to reach the Union objectives. As such, animal welfare legislation has been promulgated through Article 43 TFEU, regulating the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and through Article 114, regulating the approximation of laws for the establishment and the functioning of the internal market.[49]

It is also important to note that in EU law, animals and animal-derived products are considered “agricultural products” according to Article 38 TFEU. Such a dual status creates tensions and inconsistencies across secondary law[50] and generally drastically weakens the power of Article 13 TFEU.[51] Ultimately, Article 13 is insufficiently strong in providing more substantial protection to farm animals from the legal implications that being categorized as goods has for animals.[52]

b) Swiss Constitution

While in the EU animal welfare is not an objective of the Union, in Switzerland animal welfare is an interest protected by the law and a national objective with an equal status to other national objectives.[53] This is because animal welfare is governed by Article 80 (originally Article 25bis) of the Federal Constitution.[54] As such, animal welfare is within the sole competence of the Federal government, while the Cantons are in charge of enforcement. 

In 1973, the Swiss people voted to include animal welfare as a clause in the Constitution, thus becoming the first European country to include animal welfare as an issue by itself,[55] and still one of the few countries in the world with such a clause. Animal welfare is viewed as an essential principle of society.[56] While the adoption of Article 25bis did not affect the legal status of animals, which changed only in 2003, the constitutional article effectively signaled that animals are not inanimate things. Those who take care of them have a broad spectrum of obligations,[57] including not to cause unnecessary suffering, pain, or fear. It represents a recognition of the worth of animals’ existence entrusted to humans,[58] thus indicating that animals are not disposable. Additionally, it forces regulators to consider animal welfare in all governmental or private activities.[59]

Remarkably, the animal welfare clause applies to all animals, thus including also farm animals. While it does not prohibit specific activities, it obliges the Federal Government to promulgate laws to protect animals uniformly nationwide.[60] Because of its status, animal welfare “has the same constitutional position as fundamental human rights. Therefore, animal welfare goals can restrict the fundamental rights of humans, which are also guaranteed by the Federal Constitution”.[61] There are several areas in which conflicts between human interests and animal welfare interests could arise, including, for example, economic freedom (Article 27 Federal Constitution) or freedom of science (Article 20 Federal Constitution). In such cases, a balancing test will be required on a case-by-case basis[62] to solve the conflict. However, including animal welfare in the Constitution technically implies far-reaching changes in existing human-animal relationships by imposing limitations on how humans treat animals.[63]

According to Errass, Article 80 represents a departure from the anthropocentric approach while embracing a pathocentric one.[64] Additionally, animal welfare protection has been particularly reinforced by the adoption of Article 120 paragraph 2 of the Constitution and the recognition of the dignity of the creature.[65]

In 1985, the editorial staff of Schweizerischer Beobachter started to collect signatures for the popular initiative “against the abuses of reproductive and genetic technology on human beings”.[66] The requests of the initiative primarily focused on creating a constitutional mandate for the Parliament to legislate on reproductive technologies in human beings, including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and the handling of germ cells and living or dead germs in science, medicine, commerce, and industry. While the Federal Council considered the initiative valid, it also pointed out that focusing only on human reproductive and gene technology largely avoids tackling the effects those technologies might have on non-human animals, plants, and other organisms.[67] As such, the Federal Council proposed a counter-project to the initiative aimed at expanding the scope of the reform to other creatures.

Initially, Article 24novies of the Constitution contained the new dispositions; however, this was split into two, with Articles 119 on reproductive medicine and gene technology involving human beings and 120 on non-human gene technology.[68] As a result, on 1st January 2000, the new Swiss Constitution came into force. Of particular interest is Article 120, where paragraph 2 reads as follows:

  • The Confederation shall legislate on the use of reproductive and genetic material from animals, plants and other organisms. In doing so, it shall take account of the dignity of living beings as well as the safety of human beings, animals and the environment, and shall protect the genetic diversity of animal and plant species.[69]

This article extends the concept of dignity to non-human living beings, thus including animals.[70] It is conceived as a defense against excessive burdens on animals,[71] and it is important to note that the dignity of living beings has the same relevance as other fundamental rights,[72] against which it is weighed up.[73] Therefore, human interests do not and cannot have absolute priority.[74] The term “living beings” refers to animals, plants, and possibly other organisms but does not include species or biotopes.[75] While the concept of dignity has been incorporated into the sphere of genetic engineering, it also applies to all areas of law, including animal protection law.[76]

The inclusion of the dignity of the creature concept implies a recognition in the Swiss legal system of the inherent value of non-human beings, which must morally be respected for their own sake.[77] It indicates that no being with dignity can be treated purely like an object or be completely instrumentalized.[78] Their inherent value derives from living beings having their own good, pursuing individual goals, and being described as organic units.[79] Ultimately, the protection of animal dignity implies a “new dimension in animal welfare law”[80] as it widens the scope of the protection from the focus on avoiding suffering typical of a pathocentric approach to protecting animals because of their inherent worth.[81]

However, while human dignity and the dignity of the creature are not entirely different concepts[82] given that a term cannot be used to describe different phenomena in the same law,[83] they differ in that the former is absolute while the latter is not.[84] The dignity of the creature can be weighed against other interests. It limits how creatures can be used without questioning their use per se. As such, it has been understood that the use of genetic engineering in other species should be limited, as Article 120 of the Constitution requires that “the regulation of genetic technology be conducted with an eye to protecting the dignity of the creature”.[85] Additionally, the dignity of the creature does not provide individual rights to animals.[86] Nevertheless, the fact that it must be considered mandates the State to search for alternatives to the instrumental use of animals whenever possible.[87]

c) Comparison

The comparison between the Swiss Constitution and EU primary law regarding the protection of farm animal welfare reveals differences and similarities in how animals are perceived and protected.

The main difference stems from the fact that in the EU, animal welfare is neither an objective nor a field of competence of the Union,[88] subordinating the protection of farm animal welfare to other policies, primarily agriculture. As a result, the EU has a weaker mandate to protect farm animals because it lacks the legal basis to prioritize farm animal welfare over economic interests, given the nature of the EU as a primarily economic organization. On the other hand, in Swiss law, animal welfare protection is independent of other policies, as it is a goal included in the Constitution and applicable to all animals. Therefore, Swiss law is better equipped to question whether human interests always have priority over animal welfare. It is also important to note that in Swiss law, animals are not considered objects,[89] and this principle forms the basis for the entire legal system concerning the legal status of animals.

Another difference is that the EU recognizes animals as sentient beings but does not recognize animal dignity like the Swiss Constitution. Switzerland has adopted a biocentric animal welfare approach, which justifies its existence based on the animals’ inherent value rather than solely focusing on alleviating suffering.[90] Such an approach contrasts with the EU one, which is generally pathocentric but fundamentally anthropocentric.[91] As such, while in Switzerland animals receive their care because of their intrinsic value, in the EU animals receive care primarily to protect human interests, such as, for example, food safety.[92] The prioritization of human interests over animal welfare is indicated in EU legislation.[93]

While these are considerable differences, there are also similarities between the two legal systems. Despite the stronger legal basis for protecting farm animals in Switzerland, there is tension between economic interests and animal welfare in both Switzerland and the EU. In fact, in both cases, animal sentience and animal dignity can be violated, and the reason for this is mainly economic. According to Sobbrio, animal sentience is ignored in the EU to support the livestock industry and, as sanctioned by Article 13, also in the case of religious rites, cultural tradition, and religious heritage.[94] Similarly, in Swiss law, while a complete disregard for animal dignity is considered illegal, it is ultimately legal to violate animal dignity in case of more “important” interests, which are also usually economic when it comes to farm animals because animal dignity is subject to a weighting of interests and is not absolute like human dignity.[95] It has also been argued that the balancing test is merely a tool to legitimately instrumentalize animals.[96]

Another point of similarity lies in the treatment of animals and animal products as agricultural goods. In the EU, Article 38 TFEU and Annex I explicitly classify both as such. While Swiss law is less explicit, Article 3 of the Agriculture Act defines agriculture to include “products from arable and livestock farming,”[97] thereby implicitly treating animals as sources of agricultural products. This framing, though less direct, similarly raises tensions in secondary legislation regarding the legal status of animals.

Ultimately, Switzerland's decision to include animal welfare as a national goal and recognize animal dignity in the Constitution provides a stronger legal foundation that can potentially serve the interests of animals more effectively compared to the EU, where the absence of animal welfare as an EU objective in the Treaties results in a weaker protection, as it will be illustrated in the upcoming sections focused on secondary law. Nevertheless, while providing a stronger legal basis on the books, Swiss law is weakened by the balance of interests. In addition, by giving a relative meaning to animal dignity compared to human dignity, further inconsistencies are created in the derived statutes and regulations. Swiss law has the potential to be truly revolutionary for animal interests if given full application, but bolder decisions must be made by legislators and the judiciary.

2. EU Secondary Law and Swiss Statutes and Ordinances

a) Animal Breeding Legislation in the EU

aa) EU Directive 98/58/EC

In the EU, farm animal welfare is primarily regulated under Directive 98/58/EC concerning the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes.[98] According to Article 2, animal is defined as “any animal (including fish, reptiles or amphibians) bred or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes”.[99] Thus the Directive applies to all vertebrate animals used for farming purposes, including GE animals.[100] However, it does not apply to invertebrates.[101]

In the Directive, breeding is primarily regulated through paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Annex. Within the breeding procedures section of the Annex, the paragraphs require the following:

  • 20. Natural or artificial breeding or breeding procedures which cause or are likely to cause suffering or injury to any of the animals concerned must not be practised. This provision shall not preclude the use of certain procedures likely to cause minimal or momentary suffering or injury, or which might necessitate interventions which would not cause lasting injury, where these are allowed by national provisions.
  • 21. No animal shall be kept for farming purposes unless it can be reasonably expected, on the basis of its genotype, that it can be kept without detrimental effects on its health and welfare.

The language in paragraphs 20 and 21 originates from the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes of 1976 (“European Convention”), especially its amended version of 1992. The 1976 European Convention did not contain any provision on animal breeding. In 1992, in a Protocol of Amendment it was considered that “it is desirable to extend explicitly the scope of the Convention to apply also to certain aspects of developments in animal husbandry techniques, in particular in respect of biotechnology”.[102] As such, it expanded the scope of the European Convention to include articles regulating animal breeding, including animals produced as a result of genetic modifications of novel genetic combinations. Article 1 of the European Convention, delineating to whom the Convention applies, was amended to apply to the breeding of animals as well, and to include “animals produced as a result of genetic modifications or novel genetic combinations.”[103] More importantly, the Protocol of Amendment included a new Article 3, which mandates that:

  • Natural or artificial breeding or breeding procedures which cause or are likely to cause suffering or injury to any of the animals involved shall not be practised; no animal shall be kept for farming purposes unless it can be reasonably expected, on the basis of its phenotype or genotype, that it can be kept without detrimental effects on its health or welfare.[104]

The need for such inclusions is explained in an Explanatory Report to the Protocol of Amendment, where the introduction explains that the Convention did not explicitly reference newly identified problems to animal welfare.[105] In particular, biotechnology was recognized as a rapidly evolving technology that can have both positive and negative aspects for animal welfare and, given the lack of a specific international agreement on the matter, there was the need to define principles for animal welfare in light of the potential use of biotechnology.[106] As a result of those considerations, it was recommended to explicitly include the word “breeding” in Article 1 of the Convention, and “to refer, next to animals produced by the normal breeding process, explicitly to animals produced as a result of modifications or novel combinations of genetic material.”[107] One of the goals of the amendment was to set “a requirement that breeding programmes must be designed to avoid foreseeable suffering or injury of the animals, such as difficult deliveries and lasting deformations.”[108] However, it was pointed out that temporary or minor suffering caused by breeding would not be covered.[109] Such inclusions highlight a concern for potential impacts of breeding on animal welfare, and point out an intent to more specifically regulate breeding to protect animals.[110]

In accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention, the Standing Committee of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes[111] has promulgated Recommendations specific to the different species of animals to provide further provisions for the implementation of the European Convention principles. Those recommendations are binding for those jurisdictions that ratified them, and they have the Convention’s same legal value. Almost all those species-specific recommendations contain articles to further protect animals from the potential detrimental effects of breeding, and for some species the articles require breeding programs to be more specifically focused on enhancing animal welfare and health traits. For instance, Article 23 of the Recommendation concerning Pigs related to changes in genotype provides that “(1) Natural or artificial breeding procedures which cause or are likely to cause suffering or injury to any of the animals involved shall not be practised; no animal shall be kept for farming purposes unless it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of its phenotype or genotype, that it can be kept without detrimental effects on its health or welfare” and “(2) In breeding programmes, at least as much attention shall be paid to criteria conducive to the improvement of pigs' welfare, including health, as to production criteria. Therefore, the conservation or development of breeds or strains of pigs, which would limit or reduce animal welfare problems, shall be encouraged.”[112] Similar provisions are contained in Article 20 of the Recommendation Concerning Domestic Fowl and Article 23 of the Recommendation Concerning Turkeys.[113]

While it appears that the European Convention intended to protect animals from suffering caused by breeding, the drafting of paragraphs 20 and 21 in Directive 98/58/EC resulted in vague language that subjects the paragraphs to interpretation as the scope of the prohibition is unclear.[114] For instance, a term like “breeding procedures” is not specified, thus appearing vague.[115] To add to the confusion, there are differences in the use of this term within the different linguistic versions of the Directive. For example, while the Italian version uses the term “procedimenti di allevamento” referring broadly to production methods, the English version seems to refer to mating and breeding practices.[116] Additionally, the paragraphs do not provide a specific list of prohibited traits, and they do not mandate, like the several Recommendations do, to place as much attention to welfare traits. It is also unclear how to ensure compliance with this legislation. As a result, no Member State has ever prohibited specific breeds or traits to protect livestock in national law.[117]

bb) Species-specific Directives

Alongside Directive 98/58/EC, the EU has adopted four species-specific animal welfare directives. Those are Directive 1999/74/EC Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Protection of Laying Hens (“Egg-Laying Hens Directive”); Council Directive 2008/119/EC Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Protection of Calves (“Calves Directive”); Council Directive 2008/120/EC Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Protection of Pigs (“Pigs Directive”); Council Directive/2007/43 EC Laying Down Minimum Rules for the Protection of Chickens Kept for Meat Production.[118]

Each Directive draws to varying degrees on wording found in the earlier Council of Europe recommendations and appears to have been prompted by those texts.[119] However, contrary to the recommendations, none of them contain provisions to protect farm animals from breeding outcomes. For instance, the language of Article 23 of the Pig Recommendation is absent in the Pigs Directive.

The sole partial concession is the Directive for Chickens Kept for Meat Production, whose Recital 4 recognizes that “the fast growth rate of chicken strains currently used for this purpose is not accompanied by a satisfactory level of animal welfare and health, and that the negative effects of high stocking rates are reduced in buildings where good indoor climatic conditions can be sustained”.[120] The binding provisions that follow, however, concentrate almost entirely on environmental parameters (stocking density, ventilation, litter quality) and impose no limitations on the underlying genetic selection that causes the welfare deficits.[121] By contrast, the Domestic Fowl Recommendation does contain language concerning the changes of the genotype and phenotype, with Article 20 requiring that “1. Breeding or breeding programmes which cause or are likely to cause suffering or harm to any of the birds involved shall not be practised. In particular, birds whose genotype has been modified for production purposes shall not be kept under commercial farm conditions unless it has been demonstrated by scientific studies of animal welfare that the birds can be kept under such conditions without detriment to their health or welfare.”[122] and “2. In breeding programmes, particular attention should be paid to criteria conducive to the improvement of birds' welfare and health, as well as to production criteria. Therefore, the conservation or development of breeds or strains of animals which would limit or reduce animal welfare problems connected with, for instance, aggressiveness or feather pecking should be encouraged.”[123] None of this language was carried over into either the Broilers or the Laying Hens Directives.

The issue is further exemplified in a report on the impact of genetic selection on the welfare of chickens kept for meat production that the European Commission was required to provide to the European Parliament and the Council under Article 6 of Directive 2007/43/EC.[124] The article included that such report “may be accompanied by appropriate legislative proposals, if necessary”.[125] The report recognizes that “some welfare problems are essentially related to genetic factors”,[126] and those include legs and locomotion, ascites and sudden death syndrome, contact dermatitis.[127] While the report mentions some positive signals of welfare traits being integrated into the selection process, the report highlights two issues: on the one hand, broiler breeding is in the hands of a few companies that dominate the worldwide market, and that those companies do not disclose details on the breeding of birds and breeding sites to the Commission because they consider this information sensitive,[128] hampering regulatory scrutiny. On the other, “market pressure does not currently provide breeding companies with sufficient incentive to give welfare traits greater weighting in their breeding programmes. Competition in the chicken meat market has been mainly focused on reducing prices. Feed represents around 65 % of production costs so genetic selection has mainly focused on fast-growing rates to reduce costs. Lower feed conversion efficiency of broiler selected for welfare traits increases production costs.”[129] The report also warned that “[selection programmes] have also led to a loss of genetic diversity leading to the possible involuntary elimination of genetic traits that might be useful in the future if the conditions of production change (resistance to new diseases, new climatic conditions, etc.)”[130]

Despite those concerns, the Commission declined to propose additional legislation, reasoning that the “current legislation provides a monitoring system for animal welfare indicators in commercial conditions which could be further exploited in a context of genetic selection.”[131] The Commission also recognized that “The consumers express increasingly interest for broilers selected for welfare traits which are produced under increased costs.”[132] In effect, therefore, EU law currently permits the commercial use of broiler breeds whose genotypes and resulting phenotypes are known to compromise welfare, which is technically prohibited by Directive 98/58/EC.[133]

cc) EU Breeding Regulation

In addition to Directive 98/58/EC, animal breeding is also regulated by Regulation (EU) 2016/1012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on Zootechnical and Genealogical Conditions for the Breeding, Trade in and Entry Into the Union of Purebred Breeding Animals, Hybrid Breeding Pigs and the Germinal Products Thereof (“Breeding Regulation”) which regulates the trade in breeding animals and their germinal products, and their entry into the Union.[134] It also regulates the recognition of breeding associations and operations and the approval of their breeding programs.[135]

Within the Breeding Regulations, animal is defined as “a domestic animal of: (a) the bovine species (Bos taurus, Bos indicus and Bubalus bubalis); (b) the porcine species (Sus scrofa); (c) the ovine species (Ovis aries); (d) the caprine species (Capra hircus); or (e) the equine species (Equus caballus and Equus asinus);”[136] Poultry animals are excluded, whose breeding is regulated within the farm animal welfare legislation. While there is no definition of breeding, breeding programme is defined as “a set of systematic actions, including recording, selection, breeding and exchange of breeding animals and their germinal products, designed and implemented to preserve or enhance desired phenotypic and/or genotypic characteristics in the target breeding population.”[137]

The only reference to animal welfare made within this regulation can be found in the preamble. Recital 11 highlights that selective breeding focused on productivity traits has “in some cases, led to undesirable side effects, raising concerns in society about animal welfare”.[138] The Recital continues by suggesting that “The application of genomics and the use of advanced information technologies such as ‘Precision livestock farming’ — which allows large data sets on alternative traits, directly or indirectly related to animal welfare and sustainability issues, to be recorded — hold considerable potential to address concerns in society and achieve the objectives of sustainable animal breeding in terms of improved resource efficiency and the enhanced resilience and robustness of animals. The collection of data on these alternative traits should gain in importance within the framework of breeding programs and should be given greater prominence in the definition of selection objectives.”[139] This Recital highlights that, according to EU legislators, further breeding informed by data on traits related to animal welfare has the potential to address societal concerns and increase animal welfare.

Nevertheless, the regulation fails to provide any more concrete provision for breeders to effectively include fitness traits like welfare, longevity, and disease resistance in breeding programs, leaving breeders' choices largely unregulated and unchecked. In fact, there are no provisions in the Breeding Regulation to protect animals from the detrimental effects that selective breeding might have. The lack of regulation has also been noted by the EU Commission’s Fitness Check of the EU Animal Welfare Legislation, which states that “many genotypes and phenotypes have been selected which have negative welfare consequences, such as laying hens with a high rate of keel-bone fractures because they are too small compared to their eggs and lay too early”.[140] The Commission explains this situation by pointing to a compromise between societal expectations and industry interests.[141]

b) Animal Breeding Legislation in Switzerland

aa) Animal Welfare Act (AWA)

In response to the duty to adopt animal welfare regulations, the Swiss Parliament adopted the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) in 1978. It was revised in 2005 after including the concept of the dignity of the creature in the Constitution, and the current version came into force in September 2023. In particular, the AWA is considered a framework legislation.[142] Contrary to animal dignity, which includes all animals, the AWA applies only to vertebrates, cephalopods, and reptantia (decapods) and does not cover invertebrates.[143] However, it does not exclude entire categories of animals (i.e., it does not exclude farm animals).

The scope of the AWA is to protect the dignity and the welfare of the individual animals,[144] but not the species.[145] As such, the AWA contains the first definition of animal dignity, which was codified into law within Article 3 of the AWA:

  • dignity means the inherent worth of the animal that must be respected when dealing with it. If any strain imposed on the animal cannot be justified by overriding interests, this constitutes a disregard for the animal’s dignity. Strain is deemed to be present in particular if pain, suffering or harm is inflicted on the animal, if it is exposed to anxiety or humiliation, if there is major interference with its appearance or its abilities or if it is excessively instrumentalized.[146]

As it can be understood from the definition provided in Article 3, animal dignity includes the traditional pathocentric approach to animal protection (i.e., protection from pain, suffering, and fear). However, it adds a new biocentric dimension (i.e., protecting the inherent worth of the animal, regardless of whether the animal is experiencing any harm).[147] This switch to a biocentric approach expanded the protection of animals from the traditional pain, suffering, and fear to include aspects like humiliation, excessive instrumentalization, and significant interference with animals’ appearance.[148]

Animal breeding and genetic modification regulations are included in Section 2 of the AWA. In particular, Article 10 of AWA aims to protect the animals’ welfare and dignity from the potential adverse consequences of breeding.[149] Importantly, this article also applies to breeding farm animals although it is not only applicable to them, and while there are other areas of law that are relevant for livestock breeding such as animal diseases, food hygiene and agricultural production conditions, Article 10 is particularly geared to protect animal welfare.[150] Article 10 applies to genetically modified animals only to a limited extent, as the production of genetically modified animals requires a permit according to Article 11 AWO and within this context some violations of Article 10 are allowed based on the permit.[151] Article 10, paragraph 1, requires the following:

  • 1. The use of natural and artificial methods of breeding and reproduction must not cause any pain, suffering, harm or behavioral disorders in the parent animals or their offspring that result from or are associated with the breeding objective, subject to the provisions on animal experiments.

The wording of this paragraph underscores a protection largely focused on pathocentric impairments.[152] While dignity is not explicitly mentioned in this paragraph, it should be interpreted to protect dignity as well,[153] given that the overall scope of the AWA as codified in Article 1 is to protect not only welfare but also dignity.[154] Importantly, although a pathocentric stress always constitutes a dignity disregard, a pathocentric impairment is not necessarily required to violate animal dignity as a dignity disregard can be triggered by purely ethical reasons.[155]

While not mentioned in paragraph 1, dignity is mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 10, which states:

  • 1. The Federal Council shall issue regulations on the breeding and production of animals and define the criteria for assessing the permissibility of breeding objectives and reproduction methods; in doing so, it considers the animal’s dignity. It may prohibit the breeding, production, husbandry, import, transit, export and placing on the market of animals with certain traits, in particular physical and behavioral abnormalities.[156]
  • Through this paragraph, the legislator requested the Federal Council to promulgate further regulations on animal breeding and production and assess the permissibility of breeding objectives and reproduction methods. The issuance of rules and the assessment of breeding objectives and reproduction methods must consider animal dignity. The Federal Council also has the power to prohibit animals with specific traits impacting their physical appearance and behavior. This is in line with a more ethical protection of farm animals.

bb) Animal Welfare Ordinance (AWO)

As required by several articles of the AWA, the Federal Council passed the Animal Welfare Ordinance (AWO). Like the AWA, it was revised in 2008, with the current version coming into force in February 2025. While the AWA provides the framework for animal welfare legislation, the AWO expands the major areas of animal welfare mentioned in the AWA.[157] The AWO includes more than 220 articles and five comprehensive appendices.[158]

AWO’s Article 2 contains specific definitions that are relevant for farm animal breeding. In particular, in Article 2, paragraph 3, lit. i, “breeding” is defined as: "targeted mating of animals with a view to a breeding objective, reproduction without a breeding objective and the production of animals by means of artificial reproduction methods”.[159] Article 2, paragraph 3, lit. j provides a distinct definition for “breeding objective”, which is defined “as the expression of all internal and external characteristics of an animal sought through selection”.[160] Article 2, paragraph 3, lit. k defines “animals with pathological mutations” as “an animal that, as a result of a genetic mutation, has pain, suffering, injury, anxiety, or has undergone an invasive intervention in its physical appearance or capabilities. The mutation that compromises the animal's welfare may develop spontaneously, be physically or chemically induced, or be caused by genetic mutations”.[161] Additionally, Article 2, paragraph 3, lit. l defines “line or strain with pathological mutations” as breeding lines or strains that include animals with pathological mutations or whose breeding involves excessive instrumentation of animals.[162]

The AWO regulates breeding in Chapter 1, Section 4, Articles 25 through 30. In particular, Article 25, paragraph 1 states the following:

  • Selective breeding must target to produce healthy animals that are free of characteristics and traits that undermine their dignity.[163]

Paragraph 3 of Article 25 indicates what it is forbidden in breeding:

  • a) breeding animals which can be expected to have absent or malformed body parts or organs that are important for species-specific use and which can be expected to endure pain, suffering or harm as a result;
  • b) breeding animals with deviations from species-specific behavior that make it very difficult or impossible for them to live together with conspecifics.

cc) Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO) Ordinance on the Protection of Breeding Animals

Article 29 of the AWO requires the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO) to regulate technical matters of animal breeding. The FSVO ordinance provides breeders with specific requirements in line with the AWA and the AWO, mainly to breed healthy animals.[164] The ordinance is divided into eleven articles and two annexes.

Article 2 determines that those who breed animals must be aware of so-called burdens[165] caused by the extreme development of some specific characteristics and hereditary diseases. Part B of Article 2 adds that animals cannot be bred if the breeding objectives cause pain, suffering, and lesions or negatively affect the phenotype or animals’ natural behaviors.

To guide breeders through the breeding process, Article 3 provides a list of categories to determine the seriousness of the burden on animals. The burdens go from 0 (no burden) to 3 (severe burden) with two intermediate burdens (light and medium at 1 and 2, respectively). Notably, paragraph 2 of Article 3 determines that the burden is considered light if the development of characteristics that could compromise animal welfare can be compensated by care, housing, or feeding but without intervening on the animal or providing medical care. The ordinance contains two annexes, and Annex 1 must be used to assign an animal to a burden category.[166] To assign an animal to a specific category, the trait or the symptom that compromises the welfare the most must be used to make the decision.

Article 5 prescribes the evaluation of the burdens. Paragraph 1 requires that those who want to breed an animal with traits or symptoms that, considering the breeding objective, could lead to a medium to severe burden, must evaluate the burdens.[167] The traits and symptoms that, considering the breeding objective, can lead to a medium to severe burden are included in Annex 2. Paragraph 3 highlights that only hereditary burdens are taken into consideration. Only qualified personnel with a university degree can perform the evaluation, with expertise in veterinary medicine, ethology, or genetics.[168]

Article 6 determines which animals can be used in breeding. Animals in Category 0 or 1 can be bred. It is important to point out that it is not forbidden to breed animals with medium burdens (i.e., Category 2), but rather, they can be bred if the breeding objective aims to reduce the offspring’s burden compared to the parents. Article 7 focuses explicitly on breeders of Category 2 animals, which must document their activity by explicitly indicating the breeding strategy and the burdens that can affect parents' and offspring's health. It must also be indicated how the breeding strategy will reduce the burden on the offspring, as required by Article 6, paragraph 2.

Article 9 and Article 10 delineate the traits deemed forbidden in breeding and specific breeds that cannot be bred. Article 9 requires the following:

It is forbidden to employ animals in animal husbandry if:

  • a) they are animals that fall under aggravation category 3;
  • b) the breeding objective causes a category 3 aggravation in the offspring;
  • c) the animals are part of a breeding variety that by physical constitution or ability:
    • (1) Cannot be kept according to the needs of the species,
    • (2) Cannot assume a physiological body position,
    • (3) Cannot move according to the needs of the species,
    • (4) Cannot feed itself or raise offspring without the help of human beings;
  • d) as a result of targeted mating, it cannot be ruled out that:
    • (1) the offspring suffer from sensory deficiencies, particularly blindness or deafness, or
    • (2) complications arise during parturition due to certain anatomical conditions.

Annex 1 lists the criteria for including an animal within Category 2 or 3 of burdens. The Annex includes a table that lists the types of burdens considered and the expected effects for Category 2 and Category 3. Within the types of burdens, the table includes pain, lesions, sufferings, invasive intervention on physical appearance (phenotype), and invasive intervention on capabilities. The main difference between Categories 2 and 3 is the degree of the burden, with Category 3 describing a profound effect compared to Category 2.

Annex 2 lists burdens and symptoms that, according to the breeding objective, can lead to a Category 2 or 3 burden. In particular, some provisions include the musculoskeletal system, head malformations, skin, feathers, scales and claws, eyes, ears, brain, spinal cord, nervous system, and behavior.

dd) Ordinance on Animal Breeding

This ordinance does not directly regulate animal breeding or welfare. However, it regulates the recognition of breeding associations and private enterprises, which play an important role in breeding animals as those organizations determine the breeding objectives and programs. Following the requirements of Articles 144, paragraph 2, 147a, paragraph 2, and 177 of the Swiss Federal Act on Agriculture,[169] the Federal Council promulgated the ordinance on animal breeding, which, according to Article 1, regulates:

  • a. The recognition of breeding organizations and private breeding enterprises;
  • b. The allocation of subsidies for breeding;
  • c. The allocation of subsidies for the preservation of Swiss breeds;
  • d. The allocation of subsidies for research projects;
  • dbis. The tasks of the Swiss National Institute of Equine Breeding;
  • e. The marketing of breeding animals, their semen and unfertilized ova and embryos;
  • f. The importation of breeding and farm animals and bull semen within customs quotas.

While Chapter 1 lays out more general provisions, Chapter 2, through multiple articles, regulates matters that include the actual recognition of breeding organizations and private breeding enterprises regulating the conditions for recognition, the management of the herd book, the execution of performance tests, genetic evaluations and the recognition of breeding organizations headquartered in the EU. Chapter 3 instead regulates the disbursement of subsidies to breeding organizations, particularly by subsidizing the keeping of the heard book and executing performance tests.[170] Chapter 4 regulates the disbursement of subsidies for the preservation of Swiss breeds, which also includes a section on subsidies disbursed for conservation projects that are limited in time and the management of national genetic banks[171] as well as a section regulating subsidies disbursed to preserve Swiss breeds which status is “in critical danger” or “threatened”.[172] Chapter 7 regulates the ancestry certificates required for commercializing breeding animals, sperm, unfertilized eggs, and embryos, while Chapter 8 regulates the import of breeding and farm animals and bull semen under customs quotas.

c) Comparison

In the context of farm animal breeding, the Swiss and EU legal frameworks diverge significantly in their approach to protecting animal welfare, with Switzerland adopting comparatively stronger protections. However, both systems are similarly constrained by the influence of industry practices, which often subordinate welfare considerations to economic objectives.

Overall, the EU regulatory framework for farm animal breeding is notably limited. Only two legislative tools directly address farm animal breeding at the EU level. Directive 98/58/EC, particularly Annex paragraphs 20 and 21, is characterized by vague language and fails to explicitly prohibit the selection of specific traits that compromise animal welfare. The situation is further complicated because the EU sets only minimum standards for farm animal protection. While Member states can set stricter standards, they cannot ban the import of animals or animal products produced under lower welfare standards in other Member States.[173] This limitation has disincentivized Member States to enact stricter national laws targeting farm animal breeding. Consequently, no Member State has prohibited breeds of animals with detrimental phenotypes or genotypes so far.

On the other hand, the Breeding Regulation exacerbates these gaps by not including any substantive provisions on animal welfare besides recognizing in a recital that breeding can negatively impact animal welfare. Notably, poultry, among the most ubiquitous animals on European farms,[174] is excluded from its scope despite the presence of leading poultry genetics companies within the EU.[175] The Breeding Regulation is predominantly focused on trade and the authorization of breeding organizations, underscoring a clear prioritization of economic considerations. This regulatory gap in the EU is particularly troubling given that breeding serves as the foundation of animal production and is a significant source of animal welfare issues. It is also questionable whether recognizing that breeding can cause animal welfare problems in a recital without substantiating this concern with further regulations is sufficient to satisfy TFEU Article 13 requirement that the EU and member states “pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals” when developing and implementing policies in policy areas like agriculture and internal market because animals are sentient beings. This approach highlights a broader issue: adopting Article 13 did not trigger comprehensive reforms in EU secondary law.[176] Recognizing animal welfare issues in EU farm animal welfare legislative recitals while permitting detrimental practices persists across other species-specific directives and regulations.[177] It is also important to note that animal interests are always presented after fair competition goals, further highlighting the priorities of the EU.[178]

Furthermore, the consistent placement of animal interests as subordinate to economic priorities (e.g., fair competition) reinforces the EU’s economic focus. This hierarchy is evident in the Breeding Regulation, where preambles referencing the economic importance of farm animal breeding take precedence over mentions of welfare concerns. Ultimately, the fact that Article 13 does not require achieving any specific outcome in animal welfare but is merely a guideline clearly shows the effects of such a limited approach in deriving secondary law dominated by economic interests while leaving animal welfare considerations insufficiently addressed.

In contrast, Switzerland has adopted a more comprehensive legal framework for animal breeding, reflecting an effort to address welfare and dignity concerns more effectively. Swiss law includes several layers of protection, with an animal-centric approach that seeks to prevent the worst outcomes of selective breeding, such as physical or behavioral abnormalities as well as purely ethical violations. By including excessive instrumentalization and significant interference with animals’ appearance and abilities within the definition of animal dignity as strains, the Swiss legislators provided a stronger legal basis for limiting extreme selective breeding practices that prioritize productivity at the expense of animal welfare.

Despite this stronger legal basis, Swiss statutes and ordinances lack a specific requirement to avoid pursuing solely productivity traits. Breeders should be required to have a holistic approach to breeding, clearly mandating the incorporation of fitness traits in animal breeding objectives to improve animal welfare. This could include the requirement to integrate local breeds in herds. For example, local breeds of dairy cows generally have greater fertility, longevity and fewer metabolic diseases, reproductive disorders, and hoof health issues.[179] Nevertheless, the current provisions should prevent most of the potential harms that could result from breeding, making the real challenge one of effective enforcement.

Ultimately, Switzerland and the EU face a common issue: animal welfare regulations are often shaped by established industrial farming practices rather than challenging or reforming them. This is particularly visible in the EU, as scholars have pointed out.[180] For instance, the focus on competition and common market rules undermine the efforts to increase protection for farmed animals[181] and the development of regulations focused on animals as sentient beings.[182] Concerns like increasing comfort standards and reducing boredom are low on the EU agenda.[183] This is likely true also for the welfare problems caused by breeding, given that the issues caused by breeding received minimal attention in the EU animal welfare law fitness check produced by the EU Commission. However, even in Switzerland, the inclusion of animal dignity in the Constitution did not lead to fundamental changes to the treatment of animals, including within breeding. For example, the Swiss Federal Council has not exercised its authority under Article 25 of the AWO and Article 10 paragraph 2 of the AWA prohibiting the keeping, import, transit, export and placing on the market of animals that present clear physical and behavioral abnormalities,[184] like fast-growth breeds of broiler chickens. In fact, while it is illegal to breed fast-growth broilers in Switzerland, it is not illegal to import those animals from abroad.[185]

Ultimately, while the concept of dignity was introduced into the legal framework, which should have prompted changes in these practices, it looks as it primarily served to justify existing ones by embedding them into the law.[186]As a result, no significant changes to the practices occurred. Politicians seeking cultural and political compromise created a paradox: a progressive concept like dignity was adopted but merged with traditional industrial practices.

d) Gene Editing Legislation in the EU

aa) Directives and Regulations

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-528/16 and a recent Commission study confirmed that organisms created using new genomic techniques (NGTs), including animals, are regulated under the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) legal framework.[187] The EU GMO legislation comprises several regulations and directives[188] designed to protect human health and the environment, as well as harmonize rules about the commercialization of GMOs on the EU market.[189] Notably, no regulation or directive directly regulates genetically modified (GM) animals, as the GMO legislation primarily focuses on plants.[190] However, Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and Regulation no 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed are particularly relevant. 

Directive 2001/18 regulates the procedure for consenting to release GMOs into the environment and placing such products into the market.[191] The Directive defines GMOs as “organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination”.[192] The modification must be carried out with one of the techniques listed in Annex I(1)(1) of the Directive.[193] Indeed, some of these technologies can be used to create GM animals,[194] but the Annex list does not include the latest GE technologies as those were not available when the Directive was passed. The Directive requires a case-by-case assessment connected to GMOs releasing;[195] it sets in place a GMOs monitoring system after the release, and it also establishes a mechanism to modify, suspend, or terminate the GMOs release in case risks become known.[196] It also establishes the creation of one or more registers to record information on the modification of GMOs.[197] The Directive allows Member States to restrict or prohibit the placing on the market of GMOs only on limited grounds, particularly risk to human health and the environment.[198] Lastly, Article 29 of the Directive establishes that the Commission “shall, on its own initiative or at the request of the European Parliament or the Council, consult any committee it has created with a view to obtaining its advice on the ethical implications of biotechnology”[199] such as the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies.

Regulation 1829/2003 applies to GM animals used for food because in EU law food is defined as “any substance or product, whether processed, partially processed or unprocessed, intended to be, or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans”.[200] Live animals placed on the market for human consumption are included within the definition.[201] The regulation requires producers to apply for market authorization to sell products that contain or consist of GMOs, as well as food containing ingredients derived from GMOs or produced from GMOs.[202] The European Commission eventually provides such market authorization based on a risk assessment and an environmental effects monitoring plan. Of further relevance for animals is the guidance document for the risk assessment of food and feed that contains or consists of GM animals produced by the European Food and Safety Agency (EFSA) Panel on Animal Health and Welfare within the framework of Regulation 1829/2003.[203] The guidance document contains a detailed procedure to evaluate GM animals’ health and welfare. It is important to note that, while “genetically modified food and feed should only be authorised for placing on the Community market after a scientific evaluation of the highest possible standard, to be undertaken under the responsibility of the European Food Safety Authority (Authority)”,[204] thus EFSA must assess the safety of GM Animals, the guidance document and another EFSA guidance document for the environmental risk assessment of GM animals[205] are not legally binding. Therefore, the European Commission does not have to follow EFSA risk assessments to approve market authorizations.[206] However, when the Commission deviates from EFSA opinions it must provide an explanation.[207] At the same time, EFSA clearly states that “Ethical considerations are not part of the scientific process of risk assessment. These aspects are considered by the European Commission and EU Member States as part of their discussions on new regulations and their approval process for new products.”[208] In fact, in making its decision, the European Commission can consider “other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration” as well as other relevant provisions of EU law.[209]

Currently, there is no food and feed derived from GM animals on the EU market, as developers have not submitted any application.[210] Nevertheless, there is an increased interest in developing organisms with NGTs in the EU, including GE animals.[211] The Council of the European Union requested the European Commission to carry out a study on the status of new genomic techniques under Union law in light of Case C-528/16.[212] The study has highlighted the use of NGTs like CRISPR in animals by the livestock industry primarily for food production purposes.[213] In particular, research focuses on cattle, pigs, chickens and some fish species.[214]

The main conclusion of the study is that current applicable GMO legislation is not fit for purpose for some NGTs and derived products.[215] As a result of the study’s conclusions, the Commission has proposed a regulation on plants produced by certain NGTs, in which category 1 NGT plants (i.e., those considered equivalent to conventional ones and those that do not require the insertion of foreign DNA) would be exempted from GMO legislation.[216]

Despite the study acknowledging that GE applications in animals are increasing, it also noted that there is less information about animal applications in general and particularly in terms of safety data compared to plants.[217] Therefore, as of right now, there is no equivalent proposal for GE animals as there is for plants, which makes GE animals still regulated under GMO legislation. However, the study recognizes the importance of acquiring more information about NGT applications in animals. In 2023, EFSA published an external scientific report on NGTs in animals and their agri/food/feed products, focusing on the commercial and pre-commercial stage.[218] The report includes a comprehensive list of GE animals, the traits pursued and at what development stage they are obtained through a literature review.[219] The majority of the applications targeted food mammals, followed by aquatic species, avian species and insects.[220] The most common pursued trait category is meat and fiber yield and the most common technique used is CRISPR-Cas9.[221] Additionally, EFSA recently published a scientific opinion on new developments in biotechnology, including GE, applied to animals for food, feed and other agricultural uses.[222] The goal of the opinion is to assess the applicability and sufficiency of EFSA’s risk assessment guidance documents, covering also the animal health and welfare assessment. The document highlights that there is new scientific information about animal welfare that is not currently included in the 2012 GM animal welfare assessment and that requires it to be added. The opinion recognizes that “in the EFSA guidance on animal health and welfare of GM animals is predominantly focused on ensuring that the animals are able to function, which today does not cover the full range of animal welfare (…). Since the publication of that guidance, knowledge about animal welfare and the ability of animals to experience negative as well as positive affective states has grown considerably, leading to more recent animal welfare assessment tools focusing on a combination of animal needs and motivations, affective states, cognitive states and ability to function in a given environment”.[223]

e) Gene Editing Legislation in Switzerland

aa) The Federal Technology Law (GTA)

The new GE techniques, including CRISPR, are considered GMOs in Switzerland and thus fall under the GMOs legislation.[224] The Federal Gene Technology Act (GTA) of March 2003 is the main statute regulating genetic engineering, and it derives its authority partially from Article 120 of the Constitution. This is the first statute that incorporates the dignity of living beings.[225] However, the GTA does not contain a definition of dignity, which, as far as animals are concerned, can be found in Article 3 of the AWA.[226] It is a cross-sectorial legislation, concurring with other sectoral legislation,[227] including the AWA. As it can be read in Article 1 GTA:

  • 1) The purpose of this Act is:
  • a) to protect human beings, animals and the environment from abuses of gene technology.
  • b) to serve the welfare of human beings, animals and the environment in the application of gene technology.[228]
  • 2) In particular, it shall:
  • a) protect the health and safety of human beings, animals and the environment;
  • b) conserve biological diversity and the fertility of the soil permanently;
  • c) ensure respect for the dignity of living beings;
  • d) enable freedom of choice for consumers;
  • e) prevent product fraud;
  • f) promote public information;
  • g) take account of the significance of scientific research on gene technology for human beings, animals and the environment.

It is important to note that genetically modifying vertebrate animals for food production or recreational purposes is forbidden.[229] As it can be read in Article 9, “Genetically modified vertebrates may only be produced and put into circulation for purposes of research, therapy, or diagnostics in human or veterinary medicine”.[230] This is because using gene technologies for purposes other than those included in Article 9 violates dignity in every case.[231]

Article 5 of the GTA defines genetically modified organisms as “organisms in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur under natural conditions by crossing or natural recombination”.[232] Therefore, the GTA does not cover traditional selective breeding; it only covers gene technologies.

Of particular importance is Article 8, which deals with respecting the dignity of living beings. As it can be read in Article 8, paragraph 1:

  • 1. In animals and plants, modification of the genetic material by gene technology must not violate the dignity of living beings. In particular, violation is deemed to have occurred if such modification substantially harms species-specific properties, functions or habits, unless this is justified by overriding legitimate interests. In evaluating the harm, the difference between animals and plants must be taken into consideration.[233]

Through this article, the legislator concretized the dignity of creature concept[234] by stating that when modifying genetic material, the dignity of living beings may not be disregarded, thus requiring the dignity to be respected.[235]

It also indicates what constitutes a violation of dignity.[236] The dignity disregard by genetic modification must be clarified before the modification itself.[237] According to Errass, dignity is violated if, through gene technology, species-specific characteristics, functions, or lifestyles are impaired, and no human interests justify such impairment.[238] In particular, this is the case because the creature's dignity is a relative value that needs to be balanced with human legitimate interests that are included in paragraph 2 of Article 8 primarily for invertebrates and plants. Those include human and animal health, guaranteeing food security, reducing the harm caused to the environment, preserving and improving environmental conditions, securing a substantial economic, social, or environmental benefit for society, and increasing knowledge.[239] On the other hand, for vertebrates, crustaceans and cephalopods, Article 9 applies.[240] It is important to point out that the interests of the creatures are their own interests.[241] Therefore, the severity of the impairment caused by gene technology on animals and plants must be weighed against the importance of the mentioned human interests on a case-by-case basis. In line with the Constitution, the article limits the concept of living beings to plants and animals only, thus concretizing the constitutional provision.[242] “Animal and plants” include the whole flora and fauna, regardless of whether there are wild or domesticated animals and plants.[243] It also appears that animals are given a special prominence over plants, thus applying hierarchical biocentrism. 

It is understood that the GTA does not imply that gene editing an animal always leads to a disregard for animal dignity.[244] Whether a violation of animal dignity occurred is determined on “a case-by-case basis according to the severity of the harm suffered by animals or plants against the significance of the legitimate interests”.[245]

Through Article 23 of the GTA, the legislators established by law the federal Ethics Committee on non-human Biotechnology (ECNH). The ECNH is tasked with following and evaluating biotechnology developments and applications and providing comments on social and scientific issues from an ethical point of view.[246] In addition, the committee has an important advisory role when it comes to advising the federal government on regulation enactment and implementation and providing comments on applications for authorizations of GMOs in food production[247] and new research proposals of fundamental or exemplary significance.

Currently, per Article 37a GTA, there is a moratorium on genetically modified plants, seeds, and other plant parts, as well as genetically modified animals for agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural purposes. Therefore, Article 37a, paragraph 1, mandates that no authorization for circulating such products may be granted until 31 December 2025.[248] Nevertheless, GM vertebrate farm animals are prohibited regardless of the moratorium.

f) Comparison

Compared to traditional selective breeding regulations, within GMO legislation and policy the EU and Switzerland are largely aligned,[249] both embracing the precautionary principle in regulating GMOs, a feature of environmental law.[250] However, there are a few differences that make Swiss law more stringent and potentially better equipped to protect farm animal welfare within genetic engineering compared to the EU.

Both in Switzerland and the EU, new GE techniques like CRISPR are regulated through the GMOs legislation, which in both cases is more strictly regulated than selective breeding. At the same time, the EU legislation and Swiss statute exclude traditional breeding from the scope of the GMO legislation.

While EU GMO legislation is primarily geared to protect human health and the environment compared to the Swiss legislation, which more explicitly aims to protect animals from the abuses of gene technology, the EU legislation also aims to protect animal health and welfare. This goal is included in Article 1, paragraph a of regulation no 1829/2003.[251] However, compared to Swiss law, this overarching goal is not further substantiated with explicit protective measures from potential misuse of GM technologies on animals in any of the several directives and regulations that compose the GMO legislation.[252] Additionally, while EFSA formulated a guidance document that includes a welfare and health assessment of GM animals, it is not codified into law.

Another similarity is that both Switzerland and the EU have ethics committees that can be consulted on biotechnology applications and the derived ethical implications. The difference is that while the ECNH has been created precisely to monitor the development of biotechnology and its applications on non-human animals, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies provides the Commission with advice on ethical issues on a broader set of technologies.[253] Additionally, the EFSA clearly states that their risk assessment scientific process does not take into account ethical considerations, which could be considered by the EU Commission and Member States when discussing new regulations and the approval of new products.[254] However, it is not legally binding for them to do so and thus they can rely solely on the EFSA’s scientific findings.

Nevertheless, a difference that makes Swiss law more stringent is the protection of the dignity of the creature, which is particularly relevant within the use of gene technologies, including in animals. Articles 8 and 9 provide specific instances in which animal dignity is violated, a feature of Swiss law that finds no equivalent in EU law.

Importantly, another major difference is that in Switzerland, according to Article 9 GTA, it is forbidden to produce and circulate farm animals for food production,[255] while in the EU it is allowed, although subject to a risk assessment evaluation carried out by EFSA and a final approval from the EU Commission to allow commercialization.

III. Conclusion

This comparative analysis confirms and sharpens the critique advanced in the earlier EU-focused study: current Union rules governing farm animal selective breeding and genetic engineering (including gene editing) remain normatively thin from an animal welfare perspective and largely anthropocentric. In contrast, Swiss law incorporates an explicit “dignity of the creature” principle in its Constitution and in derived statutes and ordinances. While the EU does recognize animals as sentient beings under Article 13 TFEU, this recognition has not produced comparable effects in secondary legislation. With few exceptions, references to sentience remain relegated to recitals, while the provisions continue to reflect a predominantly productivity-oriented approach and do not substantively address farm animal welfare in the context of breeding.

Although genomic techniques in animals have received somewhat greater regulatory attention, particularly through past and ongoing EFSA efforts to assess welfare impacts, core EU GMO legislation still omits any explicit reference to animal welfare, or even to animals as a distinct regulatory subject. Meanwhile, long-standing selective breeding practices that can negatively impact welfare (such as the selection of rapid-growth traits in broilers or double-muscling in cattle) continue largely unchecked. The European Commission’s 2022 fitness check confirmed these regulatory gaps, noting that the Breeding Regulation includes no welfare safeguards and that Directive 98/58/EC’s limited provisions on breeding have failed to prevent the selection of harmful traits.

As the European Commission moves forward with its initiative to modernize farm animal welfare legislation, there is an opportunity to incorporate more specific and enforceable protections against breeding practices that compromise welfare and thus taking animal interests more seriously. Building on the reforms proposed in the earlier work, this Article recommends the adoption of three Swiss-inspired elements:

1. Recognition of animal dignity. The EU should go beyond the recognition of animal sentience to acknowledge the inherent value of animals, drawing on the Swiss Constitution’s concept of animal dignity. This would mark a normative shift toward treating animals as ends in themselves, not merely as means to human ends.

2. Introduction of a burden scale and clear breeding standards. Drawing on the Swiss FSVO ordinance, EU legislation should include clear, harmonized prohibitions on the selection or maintenance of traits linked to chronic pain, morbidity, or functional impairment. A standardized framework across the Union would assist producers in aligning breeding decisions with animal welfare priorities. At the same time, the Council of Europe’s recommendations already offer more precise language in this area, which could be codified into EU law. In addition, together with legally binding standards, complementary policy tools (e.g., targeted subsidies) could further incentivize the selection of traits focused on enhancing welfare.

3. Strengthening ethical evaluation in animal biotechnology. Every authorization for gene-edited or transgenic animals should incorporate a transparent ethical review, informed by consultation with the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies. This ethical dimension should complement EFSA’s scientific assessment and inform the Commission’s decision-making process.

By combining the previous recommendations with the comparative insights presented here, EU law would be better equipped to address the welfare harms associated with breeding and gene editing, while also responding to the growing ethical concerns of its citizens. Drawing selectively from Swiss law would not only strengthen protections within the EU but could also pave the way for closer legal harmonization and collaboration between the EU and Switzerland, supporting each other’s efforts to bring about long-awaited reforms and to ensure stronger animal protection across the continent. Lastly, although enforcement was beyond the scope of this paper, it is a fundamental component of animal protection, and greater harmonization between Swiss and EU law could foster deeper collaboration in enforcement efforts as well.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to deeply thank the incredible lawyers and staff members at Stiftung für das Tier im Recht (TIR), in particular Vanessa Gerritsen, Gieri Bolliger, Andreas Rüttimann, Sybel Konyo, Moena Zeller, and all the others for their invaluable help and support in the research and development of this article. The author is also grateful to Prof. Gerald Torres for his insightful feedback on the original draft and for his continuous support throughout the research and writing of this paper. Lastly, the author would also like to thank the Lewis & Clark Law School for allowing me to present my work at the Comparative Animal Law Postgraduate Workshop in June 2024.

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[2] European Commission,“Special Eurobarometer 533, Attitudes of Europeans towards Animal Welfare” 2023, available at <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2996> accessed 26 August 2025.

[3] See the official page of the initiative at <https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/initiatives/details/2018/
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[6] Heng-Wei Cheng, ‘Animal Welfare: Should We Change Housing to Better Accommodate the Animal or Change the Animal to Accommodate the Housing?’ (2007) No 047 CABI Reviews: Perspectives in Agriculture, Veterinary Science, Nutrition and Natural Resources 1 <https://doi.org/10.1079/PAVSNNR20072047> accessed 26 August 2025; Will Wright, Heidi J S Tworek, Marina A G von Keyserlingk, Katherine E Koralesky and Daniel M Weary, ‘Using Animal History to Inform Current Debates in Gene Editing Farm Animals: A Systematic Review’ (2022) 6 Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems 1, 5–8 <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2022.938085> accessed 26 August 2025; Schultz, Serão and Ross (n 5).

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[9] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘Gene Editing and Agrifood Systems’ (FAO 2022) <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3579en> accessed 26 August 2025.

[10] See Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Genome-Edited Animals’, POSTbrief 50 (UK Parliament 2022) <https://doi.org/10.58248/PB50> accessed 26 August 2025, 14ff; Zhiguo Liu, Tianwen Wu, Guangming Xiang, Hui Wang, Bingyuan Wang, Zheng Feng, Yulian Mu and Kui Li, ‘Enhancing Animal Disease Resistance, Production Efficiency, and Welfare through Precise Genome Editing’ (2022) 23(13) International Journal of Molecular Sciences 7331 <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijms23137331> accessed 26 August 2025; Commissie Genetische Modificatie (COGEM), ‘CRISPR & Animals: Implications of Genome Editing for Policy and Society’, (2018) Policy Report CGM/180501-01 <https://cogem.net/en/publication/crispr-animals-implications-of-genome-editing-for-policy-and-society/> accessed 26 August 2025, 25ff.

[11] Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Genome Editing and Farmed Animal Breeding: Social and Ethical Issues’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2021) <https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/genome-editing-and-farmed-animals> accessed 26 August 2025; Gaëtan Burgio and Lydia Teboul, ‘Anticipating and Identifying Collateral Damage in Genome Editing’ (2020) 36(12) Trends in Genetics 905–14 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tig.2020.09.011> accessed 26 August 2025.

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[13] Ibid 22.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, ‘Heritable Genetic Modification in Food Animals’ (The National Academies Press 2025) <https://doi.org/10.17226/27750> accessed 26 August 2025, 53ff.

[18] Ibid 53.

[19] See Willem M Rauw, Esther Kanis, Ellen N Noordhuizen-Stassen and Frank J Grommers, ‘Undesirable Side Effects of Selection for High Production Efficiency in Farm Animals: A Review’ (1998) 56(1) Livestock Production Science 15–33 <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-6226(98)00147-X> accessed 26 August 2025; Farm Animal Welfare Council, ‘Report on the Welfare Implications of Animal Breeding and Breeding Technologies in Commercial Agriculture’ (FAWC 2004) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fawc-report-on-the-welfare-implications-of-breeding-and-breeding-technologies> accessed 26 August 2025; Pascal A Oltenacu and Bo Algers, ‘Selection for Increased Production and the Welfare of Dairy Cows: Are New Breeding Goals Needed?’ (2005) 34(4) Ambio: A Journal of the Human Environment 311–15 <https://doi.org/10.1579/0044-7447-34.4.311> accessed 26 August 2025; J A MacArthur Clark, M Potter and E Harding, ‘The Welfare Implications of Animal Breeding and Breeding Technologies in Commercial Agriculture’ (2006) 103(3) Livestock Science 270–81; EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), ‘Scientific Opinion on the Influence of Genetic Parameters on the Welfare and the Resistance to Stress of Commercial Broilers’ (2010) 8(7) EFSA Journal 1666 <doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2010.1666>; Farm Animal Welfare Council, ‘Opinion on the Welfare Implications of Breeding and Breeding Technologies in Commercial Livestock Agriculture’ (FAWC 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fawc-opinion-on-the-welfare-implications-of-breeding-and-breeding-technologies-in-commercial-livestock-agriculture> accessed 26 August 2025; Este van Marle-Köster and Carina Visser, ‘Unintended Consequences of Selection for Increased Production on the Health and Welfare of Livestock’ (2021) 64 Archives Animal Breeding 177–85 <https://doi.org/10.5194/aab-64-177-2021> accessed 26 August 2025.

[20] EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Julio Alvarez, Anette Boklund, Sabine Dippel, Fernanda Dorea, Jordi Figuerola, Mette S Herskin, Virginie Michel, Miguel Angel Miranda Chueca, Eleonora Nannoni, Romolo Nonno, Anja B Riber, Karl Stahl, Jan Arend Stegeman, Hans-Hermann Thulke, Frank Tuyttens, Giulio Cozzi, Ute Knierim, Sònia Martí, Siobhan Mullan, Sean Ashe, Giulia Cecchinato, Eliana Lima, Olaf Mosbach-Schulz, Marika Vitali, Martina Benedetta Zanna and Christoph Winckler, ‘Welfare of Beef Cattle’ (2025) 23(7) EFSA Journal e9518 <https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2025.9518> accessed 26 August, 102ff.

[21] Sophia A Ward, Roy N Kirkwood and Kate J Plush, ‘Are Larger Litters a Concern for Piglet Survival or an Effectively Manageable Trait?’ (2020) 10(2) Animals 309 <https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10020309> accessed 26 August 2025.

[22] Adam Shriver, ‘Knocking Out Pain in Livestock: Can Technology Succeed Where Morality Has Stalled?’ (2009) 2 Neuroethics 115–24 <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-009-9048-6> accessed 26 August 2025; Katrien Devolder and Matthias Eggel, ‘No Pain, No Gain? In Defence of Genetically Disenhancing (Most) Research Animals’ (2019) 9(4) Animals (Basel) 154 <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6523187/> accessed 26 August 2025; Adam Shriver, ‘Prioritizing the Protection of Welfare in Gene-Edited Livestock’ (2020) 10(1) Animal Frontiers 39–44 <https://doi.org/10.1093/af/vfz053 > accessed 26 August 2025.

[23] Peter Sandøe, Paul M Hocking, Björn Förkman, Kirsty Haldane, Helle H Kristensen and Clare Palmer, ‘The Blind Hens’ Challenge: Does It Undermine the View that Only Welfare Matters in Our Dealings with Animals?’ (2014) 23 Environmental Values 727–42 <https://doi.org/10.3197/096327114X13947900181950> accessed 26 August 2025.

[24] Shriver (n 22).

[25] Arianna Ferrari, ‘Animal Disenhancement for Animal Welfare: The Apparent Philosophical Conundrums and the Real Exploitation of Animals. A Response to Thompson and Palmer’ (2012) 6 Nanoethics 65–76 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-012-0139-1> accessed 26 August 2025; Adam Henschke, ‘Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement’ (2012) 6 Nanoethics 55–64 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-012-0140-8> accessed 26 August 2025; Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 11); Susana Monsó and Sara Hintze, ‘For Their Own Good? The Unseen Harms of Disenhancing Farmed Animals’ in Cheryl Abbate and Carolyn Bobier (eds), New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism: Critical Perspectives (Routledge forthcoming).

[26] See David Grimm, ‘What Are Farm Animals Thinking?’ (2023) Science 382(6675) 1103.

[27] See Alison L Van Eenennaam and Amy E Young, ‘Public Perception of Animal Biotechnology’ in Heiner Niemann and Carmen Wrenzycki (eds), Animal Biotechnology, vol 2 (Springer 2018) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92348-2_13> accessed 23 September 2025; Maria C Yunes, Zimbábwe Osório-Santos, Marina A G von Keyserlingk and Maria J Hötzel, ‘Gene Editing for Improved Animal Welfare and Production Traits in Cattle: Will This Technology Be Embraced or Rejected by the Public?’ (2021) 13(9) Sustainability 4966 <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13094966> accessed 23 September 2025; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Public Dialogue on Genome Editing in Farmed Animals’ (2022) <https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publication/public-dialogue-on-genome-editing-and-farmed-animals/> accessed 26 August 2025.

[28] Ilaria Cimadori, Alice Di Concetto and Khara Grieger, ‘The Protection of Selectively Bred and Gene Edited Farm Animals under EU Law’ (2025) European Journal of Risk Regulation <https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2025.12> accessed 26 August 2025.

[29] Kate Sowery, ‘Sentient Beings and Tradable Products: The Curious Constitutional Status of Animals under Union Law’ (2018) 55(1) Common Market Law Review <https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2018003> accessed 26 August 2025.

[30] Treaty on European Union, Declaration on the Protection of Animals [1992] O.J. C 191/0103.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Bolliger (n 1) 45.

[33] Treaty Establishing the European Community, Protocol (no 33) on Protection and Welfare of Animals [1997] O.J. C 321E/314.

[34] Alice Di Concetto, ‘The Double-Edged Sword: International Law and Its Effects on EU Farm Animal Welfare Legislation’ (2022) 10(2) The Global Journal of Animal Law <https://journal.fi/gjal/article/view/148767> accessed 26 August 2025.

[35] Anne Peters, ‘Farm Animals in the Law of the European Union’ in Anne Peters, Animals in International Law (Brill 2021) 195–253, 210 <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004466258_006> accessed 26 August 2025.

[36] Bolliger (n 1) 46.

[37] Di Concetto (n 34).

[38] Amato Mangiameli, ‘Article 13 TFEU’ in Hermann-Josef Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli (eds), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – A Commentary, Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1–89 (Springer Nature 2021).

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Peters (n 35) 211.

[42] Sowery (n 29).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Peters (n 35) 212.

[45] Paola Sobbrio, ‘The Relationship between Humans and Other Animals in European Animal Welfare Legislation’ (2013) 1(1) Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism 73–84 <https://doi.org/10.7358/rela-2013-001-sobb> accessed 26 August 2025.

[46] Peters (n 35) 198ff.

[47] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/51, art 4(2)(d).

[48] TFEU, art 4(2)(a).

[49] Alice Di Concetto, For a More Humane Union: A Legal Assessment of EU Farm Animal Welfare Legislation (The European Institute for Animal Law & Policy 2022).

[50] Sowery (n 29).

[51] Peters (n 35) 212.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Vanessa Gerritsen, ‘Animal Welfare in Switzerland – Constitutional Aim, Social Commitment, and a Major Challenge’ (2013) 1 The Global Journal of Animal Law <https://journal.fi/gjal/article/view/148687> accessed 26 August 2025.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Gieri Bolliger, Animal Dignity Protection in Swiss Law – Status Quo and Future Perspectives (Schulthess 2016) 25.

[56] Gerritsen (n 53).

[57] Ibid.

[58] Botschaft Tierschutzartikel (Fn. 192), BBI 1972 II 1479 cited in Christoph Errass, ‘20 Jahre Würde der Kreatur’ (2013) 149 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins (ZBJV).

[59] Gerritsen (n 53).

[60] Bolliger (n 55) 26.

[61] Ibid 27.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid 28.

[64] Errass (n 58) 218.

[65] Gerritsen (n 53); see paragraph above.

[66] As Italian is an official language of Switzerland, the author consulted primary sources in Italian and provides references in Italian throughout the paper. Messaggio del 18/09/1989 concernente l’iniziativa popolare “contro gli abusi della tecnologia riproduttiva e genetica sull’essere umano”, FF 1989 III 881.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Errass (n 58); James Toomey, ‘Constitutionalizing Nature’s Law: Dignity and the Regulation of Biotechnology in Switzerland’ (2020) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 1–33 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa072> accessed 26 August 2025.

[69] Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 (Swiss Constitution, RS 101), art 120 para 2.

[70] It is understood that all animals are included within the animal dignity concept. See Bolliger (n 55) 36.

[71] Peter Krepper, ‘Tierwürde im Recht – am Beispiel von Tierversuchen’ (2010) 3 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP/PJA) 303.

[72] Peter Krepper, Zur Würde der Kreatur in Gentechnik und Recht – Thesen zum gentechnischen Umgang mit Tieren in der Schweiz unter Berücksichtigung des internationalen Rechtsumfelds (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1998).

[73] Margot Michel, ‘Die Würde der Kreatur und die Würde des Tieres im schweizerischen Recht’ (2012) 34 Natur und Recht 102 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10357-012-2214-3> accessed 23 September 2025; Bolliger (n 55) 54ff.

[74] Michel (n 73).

[75] Krepper (n 72); Errass (n 58); Bolliger (n 55) 36.

[76] Michel (n 73); Bolliger (n 55) 37.

[77] Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe and Peter Schaber, Was heisst Würde der Kreatur? Gutachten für das Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und Landschaft (Schriftenreihe Umwelt 294 1997); Krepper (n 72); Michel (n 73).

[78] Ina Praetorius and Peter Saladin, Die Würde der Kreatur (Art. 24 novies Abs. 3 BV), Schriftenreihe Umwelt 260 (Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und Landschaft 1996); Michel (n 73).

[79] Errass (n 58); Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe and Peter Schaber, ‘Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering’ (2000) 13 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 7–27 <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009536230634> accessed 26 August 2025.

[80] Bolliger (n 55) 66.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Praetorius and Saladin (n 78).

[83] Peter Saladin, ‘“Würde der Kreatur” als Rechtsbegriff’ in Julian Nida-Rümelin and Dietmar von der Pfordten (eds), Ökologische Ethik und Rechtstheorie (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1995) 365.

[84] Michel (n 73).

[85] Swiss Constitution, art 120(2); James Toomey, ‘Constitutionalizing Nature’s Law: Dignity and the Regulation of Biotechnology in Switzerland’ (2020) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 1–33 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa021> accessed 26 August 2025.

[86] Michel (n 73).

[87] Ibid.

[88] Di Concetto (n 34).

[89] Swiss Civil Code of 10 December 1907 (RS 210), art 641a.

[90] Margot Michel, ‘Law and Animals: An Introduction to Current European Animal Protection Legislation’ in Anne Peters, Saskia Stucki and Lucia Boscardin (eds), Animal Law: Reform or Revolution? (Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2015).

[91] Luca Leone, ‘Farm Animal Welfare under Scrutiny: Issues Unsolved by the EU Legislator’ (2020) 12(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 47–84 <doi:10.2924/EJLS.2019.017> accessed 23 September 2025.

[92] Sobbrio (n 45).

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Gieri Bolliger, Michelle Richner, Andreas Rüttimann and Nils Stohner, Schweizer Tierschutzstrafrecht in Theorie und Praxis (Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2019).

[96] David Shaw, Christian Rodriguez Perez and Kirsten Persson, ‘Slaying the Swiss Unicorn of Animal Dignity’ (2024) 14(3) Animals 507 <https://doi.org/10.3390/ani14030507> accessed 26 August 2025.

[97] Legge Federale sull’Agricoltura (LAgr) of 29th April 1998 (RS 910.1), art 3(1)(a).

[98] Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes [1998] OJ L221/23–27 (‘Directive 98/58/EC’).

[99] Ibid art 2.

[100] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[101] Directive98/58/EC, [1998] OJ L 221/23, art 1, 2 (d).

[102] Council of Europe, Protocol of Amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes, 1992, ETS 145.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid. 

[105] Council of Europe, Explanatory Report– ETS 145 1 para 3.

[106] Ibid 1 para 7.

[107] Ibid 2 art 1.

[108] Ibid 2 art 2.

[109] Ibid. 

[110] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[111] Expert group composed of Representatives of the Parties to the Convention.

[112] Council of Europe, Recommendation Concerning Pigs adopted by the Standing Committee of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes (T-AP) on 2 December 2004, art 23 para 1 and 2.

[113] Council of Europe, Recommendation Concerning Domestic Fowl (Gallus gallus) adopted by the Standing Committee on 28 November 1995 at its thirtieth meeting (1995), art 20; Council of Europe, Recommendation Concerning Turkeys adopted by the Standing Committee of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes (T-AP) on 21 June 2001, art 23.

[114] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[115] Ibid.

116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens (“Laying Hens Directive”),[1999] OJ L203/53–57; Council Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves (codified version) (“Calves Directive”) [2009] OJ L10/7–13; Council Directive 2008/120/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs (codified version) (“Pigs Directive”), [2009] OJ L47/5–13; Council Directive 2007/43/EC of 28 June 2007 laying down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production ("Chicken Directive"), [2007] OJ L182/19–28.

[119] Di Concetto (n 49).

[120] Chicken Directive, [2007] OJ L182/19, recital 4.

[121] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[122] Recommendation concerning Domestic Fowl, art 20(1).

[123] Ibid art 20(2).

[124] Chicken Directive, [2007] OJ L182/19, art 6(1).

[125] Ibid.

[126] European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Impact of Genetic Selection on the Welfare of Chickens Kept for Meat Production’ COM (2016) 182 final, 7 April 2016.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Referring to Article 6(2) of Council Directive 2007/43/EC in which “Member States shall submit to the Commission the results of the data collection based on monitoring of a representative sample of flocks slaughtered during a minimum period of one year. In order to enable a relevant analysis, the sampling and the data requirements as referred to in Annex III should be scientifically based, objective and comparable, and laid down in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11. Member States may need a Community financial contribution for the collection of data for the purpose of this Directive.”

[132] European Commission, COM (2016) 182 final, 7 April 2016.

[133] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[134] Regulation (EU) 2016/1012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on Zootechnical and Genealogical Conditions for the Breeding, Trade in and Entry into the Union of Purebred Breeding Animals, Hybrid Breeding Pigs and the Germinal Products Thereof (“Breeding Regulation”), 2016 OJ L171/66–143, art 1(a),

[135] Ibid art 1(b).

[136] Ibid art 2(1).

[137] Ibid art 2(26).

[138] Ibid recital 11.

[139] Ibid.

[140] European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Executive Summary of the Fitness Check of the EU Animal Welfare Legislation’ SWD (2022) 329 final, 4 October 2022 <https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/aw_eval_revision_swd_2022-329_en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2025, 44.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Gerritsen (n 53).

[143] Bolliger (n 55) 67; Gerritsen (n 53).

[144] Legge Federale Sulla Protezione degli Animali (LPAn) of 16th December 2005 (RS 455), art 1.

[145] ECNH (1999), Stellungnahme zur Konkretisierung der Würde der Kreatur im Rahmen der geplanten Revision des Tierschutzgesetzes.

[146] LPAn art 3 para a.

[147] Krepper (n 71); Michel (n 73).

[148] Nora Flückiger, Tierschutzrechtliche Schranken der Tierzucht – Auslegung und Umsetzung von Art. 10 TSchG (Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2021) 61.

[149] Bolliger Gieri, Michel Margot, Jositsch Daniel, Gerritsen Vanessa and Rüttimann Andreas (eds), Kommentar zum Schweizer Tierschutzgesetz (Schulthess Verlag 2025, in print).

[150] Flückiger (n 148) 132.

[151] Bolliger et al. (n 149).

[152] Flückiger (n 148) 134.

[153] Bolliger et al. (n 149).

[154] LPAn, art 1; Flückiger (n 148) 134.

[155] Ibid.

[156] LPAn, art 10 para 1 and 2.

[157] Gerritsen (n 53).

[158] Bolliger (n 55) 29.

[159] Ordinanza sulla protezione degli animali (OPAn) of April 23 2008 (RS 455.1), art 2 para 3 lit. i.

[160] OPAn, art 2 para 3 lit. j

[161] OPAn, art 2 para 3 lit. k

[162] OPAn, art 2 para 3 lit. l

[163] OPAn, art 25 para 1.

[164] Ordinanza dell’USAV sulla protezione degli animali nell’allevamento of 4th December 2014 (RS 455.102.4), art 1.

[165] In the official languages’ versions, “burden” is translated with “aggravio” in Italian, “contrainte” in French and “Belastung” in German. English is not an official language of Switzerland.

[166] Ordinanza dell’USAV (n 164), art 4 para 1.

[167] Ordinanza dell’USAV (n 164), art 5 para 1.

[168] Ordinanza dell’USAV (n 164), art 5 para 4.

[169] Legge federale sull’agricoltura (LAgr) of 29 April 1998 (RS 910.1).

[170] Ordinanza sull’allevamento di animali (OAlle) of 31 October 2012 (SR 910.310), art 14a para 2.

[171] OAlle, ch 4, s 2.

[172] OAlle, ch 4, s 3.

[173] Di Concetto (n 34).

[174] European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Impact of Genetic Selection on the Welfare of Chickens Kept for Meat Production, COM (2016) 182 final, 7 April 2016 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0182> accessed 16 September 2025, 4.

[175] Ibid 5.

[176] Alice Di Concetto, Le pouvoir des lobbies privés face au mouvement de protection animale. Les mutations contemporaines du droit de l’animal, édité par Olivier Le Bot (DICE Éditions 2023).

[177] Di Concetto (n 34).

[178] Ibid.

[179] Luis Fernando Brito, Nicolas Bedere, Frederic Douhard, Hinayah Rojas de Oliveira, Mathieu Arnal, Francisco Peñagaricano, Allan Paul Schinckel, Christine F Baes and Filippo Miglior, ‘Review: Genetic Selection of High-Yielding Dairy Cattle toward Sustainable Farming Systems in a Rapidly Changing World’ (2021) 15(S1) Animal 100292 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.animal.2021.100292> accessed 23 September 2025.

[180] See Di Concetto (n 34).

[181] Ibid.

[182] Sobbrio (n 45).

[183] Mariann Molnár, ‘Transforming Intensive Animal Production: Challenges and Opportunities for Farm Animal Welfare in the European Union’ (2022) 12 Animals 2086 <https://doi.org/10.3390/ani12162086> accessed 16 September 2025.

[184] Bolliger et al. (n 149).

[185] Vanessa Gerritsen, Alexandra Spring and Stefanie Walther, Die Schweizer Hühnermast und ihre Produktionsbedingungen unter BTS-Standard (Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2019) 19.

[186] In other areas too, e.g. in the regulation of the breeding of genetically modified laboratory animals, the legislator based its decisions largely on existing practice for reasons of practicability. See Vanessa Gerritsen, Güterabwägung im Tierversuchsbewilligungsverfahren (TIR-Schriften – Band 23, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2022) 556.

[187] Case C-528/16, Confédération paysanne and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’agriculture, de l’agroalimentaire et de la forêt, 25 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:583; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Study on the Status of New Genomic Techniques under Union Law and in Light of the Court of Justice Ruling in Case C-528/16’ SWD(2021) 92 final, 29 April 2021.

[188] Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/1–39; Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed [2003] OJ L268/1–23; Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory [2015] OJ L68/1–8; Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC [2003] OJ L268/24–28; Directive 2009/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms [2009] OJ L125/75–97; Regulation (EC) 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms [2003] OJ L287/1–10. Those pieces of legislation are supplemented by additional implementing rules, recommendations and guidelines on more specific aspects. For further information, see “GMO Legislation” available at: < https://food.ec.europa.eu/plants/genetically-modified-organisms/gmo-legislation_en>.

[189] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/5 6, art 1.

[190] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[191] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/1–39.

[192] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/4, art 2(2).

[193] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/17, Annex I (1)(1).

[194] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[195] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/5, art 4(3).

[196] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/13, art 20.

[197] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/15, art 31.

[198] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106, art 23. However, Article 26b (3) of Directive 2015/412 amends Directive 2001/EC/18 by expanding the reasons Member States can prohibit or restrict authorized GMOs, including environmental policy objectives and public policy. Directive 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2005 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory, [2015] OJ L 68/1.

[199] Directive 2001/18/EC, [2001] OJ L106/15, art 29.

[200] Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/7, art 2.

[201] Regulation 178/2002, [2002] OJ L31/7, art 2(b).

[202] Regulation 1829/2003, [2003] OJ L268/7, art 5; Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[203] EFSA Panels on GMO and AHAW, ‘Scientific Opinion on the Guidance on the Risk Assessment of Food and Feed from Genetically Modified Animals and Animal Health and Welfare Aspects’ (2012) 10(1) EFSA Journal 2501.

[204] Regulation 1829/2003, [2003] OJ L268/2, preamble 9.

[205] EFSA GMO Panel (EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms), ‘Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Animals’ (2013) 11(5) EFSA Journal 3200.

[206] Cimadori, Di Concetto and Grieger (n 28).

[207] Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, [2003] OJ L 268/9, art 7(1).

[208] EFSA, ‘Genetically Modified Animals — EFSA’s Role’ <https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/genetically-modified-animals#efsas-role> accessed 16 September 2025.

[209] Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, [2003] OJ L 268/9, art 7(1).

[210] EFSA (n 208).

[211] European Commission (n 187) 16.

[212] Ibid 2.

[213] Ibid 16.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Ibid 59.

[216] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Plants Obtained by Certain New Genomic Techniques and Their Food and Feed, and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/625’ COM(2023) 411 final, 5 July 2023; see also European Parliament, ‘Spotlight JD 23-24: File – Plants Produced by Certain New Genomic Techniques’ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/spotlight-JD%2023-24/file-plants-produced-by-certain-new-genomic-techniques?sid=8801> accessed 16 September 2025.

[217] European Commission (n 187) 3.

[218] Alison L Van Eenennaam, ‘New Genomic Techniques (NGTs) Animals and their Agri/Food/Feed Products’ (EFSA Supporting Publication 2023:EN-8311, 2023) <https://doi.org/10.2903/sp.efsa.2023.EN-8311> accessed 16 September 2025.

[219] Ibid.

[220] Ibid.

[221] Ibid.

[222] EFSA (n 12).

[223] Ibid.

[224] Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology (ECNH), Precaution in the Environmental Field: Ethical Requirements for the Regulation of New Biotechnologies (2018) 3.

[225] Bolliger (n 55) 43.

[226] Krepper (n 71). 

[227] Franz Xaver Perrez, Christoph Errass and Krisztina Bende, ‘GMO-Regulation: Case Study of Switzerland’ (December 2003) <http://www2.law.nyu.edu> accessed 16 September 2025.

[228] Legge federale sull’ingegneria genetica nel settore non umano (LIG) of 21 march 2003 (RS 814.910), art 1 para 1 lit. a and b.

[229] Flückiger (n 148) 102; Bolliger et al. (n 149).

[230] LIG, art 9; see also Gerritsen (n 186) 168–171.

[231] Errass (n 58) 225.

[232] LIG, art 5 para 2.

[233] LIG, art 8 para 1.

[234] Errass (n 231); Perrez, Errass and Bende (n 227).

[235] Errass (n 231) 219.

[236] Bolliger (n 55) 43.

[237] Errass (n 231) 224.

[238] Ibid 222.

[239] LIG, art 8 para 2.

[240] There is also the need to look at Article 137 paragraph 1 of the AWO for a specific definition of what science is meant in the context of Article 9 LIG. See also Gerritsen (n 186) 171.

[241] Errass (n 231) 222.

[242] Perrez, Errass and Bende (n 227).

[243] Ibid.

[244] Bolliger (n 55) 43.

[245] See LIG, art 8 para 2.

[246] Perrez, Errass and Bende (n 227).

[247] Christoph Errass, ‘Genetic Technology and Food Safety: Country Report – Switzerland’ in Rudolf Norer (ed), Genetic Technology and Food Safety (Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 14, Springer 2016) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23995-8_8> accessed 23 September 2025.

[248] LIG, art 37a para 1.

[249] Perrez, Errass and Bende (n 227).

[250] Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology (ECNH) (n 224) 4. 

[251] Regulation 1829/2003, [2003] OJ L268/5, art 1(a).

[252] Bolliger (n 1) 171.

[253] European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), <https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/support-policy-making/scientific-support-eu-policies/european-group-ethics_en#members> accessed 22 September 2025.

[254] EFSA (n 208).

[255] Bolliger et al. (n 149).

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